

~~TOP SECRET DAUNT~~

5 Oct 60

WEEKLY COMINT ECONOMIC BRIEFING

1. INDICATIONS OF SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS TO CUBA

Soviet shipping and [redacted] messages of 23 September indicate that the cargo ship Atkarsk had arrived that day in Port Nikolaev (the primary Soviet Black Sea port for loading arms for export) to load 2,454 tons of "Yastrebov's" cargo and was scheduled to arrive in Cuba between 21 and 31 October. (Yastrebov, a Soviet trade official, has been associated with the export of Soviet military cargo from Port Nikolaev since 1956.) These messages also reveal that the cargo ship Nikolaj Burdenko, (which loaded 3,234 tons of unknown cargo in Nikolaev from 9 to 16 September), would arrive in Cuba between 10 and 20 October.

Communications intelligence also indicates that the Soviet ship Kirov is probably now en route to Cuba, possibly carrying arms; and that another ship (Leningorsk) is now loading cargo at Nikolaev for Cuba.

(Two Soviet ships are known to have delivered military equipment to Cuba; the Ilya Mechnikov on 8 September and the Solnechnogorsk on 23 September.)

DECLASSIFICATION AND DISSEMINATION INFORMATION
by Director, NSA/POL-2/CIO
[Signature] GPO 2 Oct 98

8. PRESENCE IN CUBA OF SOVIET ARMS EXPORT CHIEF

Information has become available that during the first week of August the [redacted] Embassy in Havana received visa requests from two officials of the Soviet Chief Engineering Directorate (CED) of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, the Soviet organization responsible for export of military equipment. The two officials--Deputy Chairman of the CED

-3-

~~TOP SECRET DAUNT~~

DECLASSIFIED per SECDEF 450.12068

by Director, NSA/CSS, GGD

Bau date 2 Oct 98

DECLASSIFIED per E.O. 13526
by Director, NSA/CSS, CSC
PDC 1000 2 Oct 98

10. PLANNED CUBAN PURCHASE OF SOVIET HELICOPTERS

In an 18 May plain-text message, the Head of the Soviet Commercial Mission in Havana informed the Soviet All-Union Association for Motor Vehicle Export that a contract for helicopters was to be signed with Cuba in two days, and he requested that the planes be shipped urgently since a letter of credit was being opened. (On 3 April the Soviet Commercial Mission in Havana had requested information on passenger and freight helicopters, including agricultural versions.)

~~TOP SECRET DAUNT~~

M. A. Sergeychik and Yastrebov, an individual who has been associated since 1956 with the loading of arms cargo for Indonesia and the Middle East--applied for visas to pass through the [redacted] enroute to Moscow from Havana. This is the first indication that CED officials have been to Cuba. However, the head of the Czech arms export organization is known to have been in Cuba in early June.

[redacted]

-4-

~~TOP SECRET DAUNT~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
1 Feb 61
DIST: O/D

SPANISH-SPEAKING PILOT NOTED IN CZECHOSLOVAK AIR ACTIVITY
AT TRENCIN, 17 JANUARY

Czechoslovak air-ground communications observed on 17 January 1961 on a frequency of 114.25 mcs (combined bomber training/tactical frequency allocated to the 46th Bomber Division/S341, Prerov) show that a Spanish-speaking pilot was probably undergoing flight training of an unidentified type at Trencin airfield (48-52N 18-01E).

At approximately 0849Z, an unidentified Spanish-speaking pilot was in contact with the Trencin airfield tower control (callword TENOR-1). The transmission was subsequently blocked by a Czech transmission and only six numbers (217213), given in Spanish, were heard. Two other pilots, speaking Czech and utilizing pilot suffixes 181 and 175 (unidentified), were also noted in contact with the Trencin controller, but there was no indication that these pilots were working together or with the Spanish-speaking pilot.

COMMENT: This is the first known VHF activity at Trencin by a Spanish-speaking pilot. Use of the S341 frequency suggests that this pilot was possibly in a bomber or bomber trainer; however, activity at Trencin noted in previous COMINT has not been identifiable as bomber activity.

Spanish-speaking pilots were noted previously communicating on HF with the Trencin airfield controller on 11 October 1960, and were believed to be training in ground attack aircraft (see [REDACTED], 13 Oct 60). Subsequent Trencin-controlled activity in October, also on HF, included references to the YAK-11, a piston engine trainer (DIST: OSCAR/DELTA; PLUS GCU FONTEINERBLEAU.)

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1 PAGE

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, UK~~

[REDACTED] 25Y3
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
10 Apr 61
DIST: [REDACTED]

25Y3

[REDACTED] 25Y3

SOVIET MERCHANT SHIP NIKOLAJ BURDENKO DELIVERS MILITARY CARGO TO CUBA

1. The Soviet passenger cargo ship NIKOLAJ BURDENKO (UPVY, 5840GT) possibly arrived at a Cuban port late evening 7 April or early morning 8 April with an unspecified amount of YaSTREBOV's^a cargo.
2. The NIKOLAJ BURDENKO was in port Nikolaev 15 March and was scheduled to load YaSTREBOV's cargo. The ship probably departed from Nikolaev on 21 March and passed Istanbul on the 22nd. At 251500Z the ship was at 37-26N 06-03E. Since then the ship's position has not been revealed in her daily reports. On 7 April limited D/F placed the BURDENKO near the Windward Passage.
3. This is the third noted instance of a Soviet ship loading cargo specifically described as "YaSTREBOV's" for Cuba.

a. An official of the Chief Engineering Directorate of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations involved in the export of Soviet military equipment from Nikolaev.

(DIST: [REDACTED])

~~SECRET SABRE~~

13 Apr 61
Correction No. 1 to: [REDACTED] 13 (7)
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
10 Apr 61
DIST: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

CORRECTION NO. 1 TO

SOVIET MERCHANT SHIP NIKOLAJ BURDEIKO DELIVERS
MILITARY CARGO TO CUBA

In paragraph 3 change "third" to "fourth."

(DIST: [REDACTED])

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS ONE PAGE

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~CREP REPOSITORY RECORD COPY~~

P

~~SECRET~~

OPERATORS' CHATTER REVEALS CUBAN AIR FORCE PERSONNEL TO LEARN RUSSIAN'

[CHATTER BETWEEN]

San Antonio de los Baños: --
[and]
[C% Rancho Boyeros]

23 May 61
--
--

[1]^a Do you know who I talked with yesterday? Czechoslovakia.

[2]^b Oh yes, did you talk with them?

[1] I talked with OLIN Y CINCO^c.

[2] What does OLIN Y CINCO have to say?

PAGE 1 of 5 PAGE(s)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CS3
BW date 2 Oct 98

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET~~

[1] He was very hard to understand. We have to speak using code words.

[2] You do?

[1] Yes. The language is kind of hard. Say [XG], how did you find out about the [XM] pilot? They are going to open the Badilla^d.

[2] What's happening there?

[1] Badilla^d is like opening a hatch. Do you understand? [XM] Say airplane [XM]

[2] But you told me that only 2 or 3 were coming.

[1] Are you crazy?

[2] 2 or 3?

PAGE 2 of 5 PAGE(s)

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 of 5 PAGE(s)

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET~~

You told me that 2 or 3 were coming at first for training.

[1] 2 or 3? Do you know how many [XG]? Over 1,000. Now everybody wants to take the mechanics examination.

[2] And what do you want?

[1] Do you think they will send us those planes?

[2] [XM]

[1] Do you think that those planes will be assembled at [XM]

[2] [XM] Yes.

[1] Say, did you know that one of those planes does not have equipment [XM]

[2] [XM]

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 of 5 PAGE(s)

PAGE 3 of 5 PAGE(s)

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET~~

[1] Do you understand? Do you think Radar will be sent over here and [XM]?

[2] Yes.

[1] Say, that is what we have been needing here.

[XM]

[1] The Russian course [XM]

[2] Yes.

[1] Two months. I had been listening to it over here. Did you know that I've [pause]. Oh we have to learn Russian.

[2] Who?

[1] Everybody here.

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 4 of 5 PAGE(s)

PAGE 4 of 5 PAGE(s)

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET~~

[2] Everybody?

[1] Yes, they have sent a [XM] from there with [XG] words. [XM]
one of those leaflets.

[2] Are they limited?

[1] [XM] What is that for?

[2] Yes, for our use.

[1] How is it going to be arranged for the people to use the
language there?

[2] [XM] According to [XM]

[XM]

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 5 of 5 PAGE(s)

- a. San Antonio de los Baños.
- b. Rancho Boyeros.
- c. As transcribed, not identified, possibly a code word.
- d. Meaning unknown.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE 5 of 5 PAGE(s)

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET SABRE~~

P

~~SECRET~~

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

RADAR BEING INSTALLED; POSSIBLY FOR USE WITH ARTILLERY UNITS

[OPERATOR CONVERSATION BETWEEN TWO UNKNOWN STATIONS:]

18 Jun 61

--
--

[U] How are things there?

[U] Good. Let me tell you that things are hot here. We now have radar here and all that so that no [XM] us.

[U] How is that?

[U] We now have radar here.

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 1 of 4 PAGE(s)

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12958
by Director, NSA/Chief, CS3
J.W. date 2 Oct 98

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET~~

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

- [U] Where is it?
- [U] Here beside the station; under some mango trees which are near by.
- [U] Beside the (B% howitzers)?
- [U] But outside in the open air.
- [U] Well, who will operate it?
- [U] I don't know. I haven't been there yet. I passed by and saw the (B% directional antennas) [XM] there but returned yesterday. You understand what the course is about now. He is learning about radar [and] these matters.
- [U] Huh?

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 of 4 PAGE(s)

~~SECRET SABRE~~

PAGE 2 of 4 PAGE(s)

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET~~

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

[U] You already know.

[U] The [XM] are already up.

[U] They are already up; at least they are here.

[U] Tell me, is it on a truck or is it a separate apparatus?

[U] No, there are two trucks there and the apparatus are separate.
They are huge towers which look like television antennas;
like the television tower there.

[U] Do they rotate?

[U] Well, I don't think that they are working yet. However, they
are up and they resemble the television antennas there.

PAGE 3 of 4 PAGE(s)

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 3 of 4 PAGE(s)

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET~~

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

[U] That is good.

[U] Is that what you understood?

[U] Yes, because this one has to be rotated.

[U] Yes, to work. I saw it while they were testing yesterday or the day before and the large apparatus was rotating but it has not been installed on the base yet.

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 4 of 4 PAGE(s)

PAGE 4 of 4 PAGE(s)

~~SECRET SABRE~~

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
19 Jun 61
DIST: [REDACTED]

SPANISH-SPEAKING PILOTS TRAINING AT TRENCIN AIRFIELD, CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
ON 31 MAY 1961

Training of at least four Spanish-speaking pilots at Trenčín airfield (48-52H 18-01E) was noted in Czechoslovak air-ground communications (VHF voice) on 31 May 1961. The nationality of the pilots has not been determined; study continues, however.

Between 1631Z and 1730Z these pilots were in continual contact with the Trenčín airfield tower control (call sign TENOR-1) on a frequency allocated to the 46th Bomber Division/S3hl, Prerov (49-26H 17-25E); the pilots used suffixes (714, 787, 794, and 796) from a block probably allocated to the unidentified ground attack unit at Trenčín, which is believed to be subordinate to S3hl.

It is noteworthy that during this activity the Spanish-speaking trainees apparently engaged in air-to-air communication, as evidenced by the following transmission:

<u>Time</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>Text</u>
1727Z	TENOR-1	796	794 [is at] altitude 3000 meters [in the] zone; permission to carry out maneuver....

This is the first time that air-to-air communication between Spanish-speaking trainees has been noted.

Two pilots speaking Czech and using pilot suffixes (B val 798) and 91 (presumably 791) were also active during the same period. Although they made reference to zones "A" and "D," suggesting tactical activity, there was no indication that they were working together or with the Spanish-speaking pilots. However, a study of voice characteristics discloses that Spanish may not be the native tongue of one of the pilots who used that language, suggesting that he may have been a Czech using Spanish to facilitate training commands.

For information on previously observed activity by Spanish-speaking pilots at Trenčín, recipients of [REDACTED] 1 Feb 61, should refer. (DIST:
[REDACTED])

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1 PAGE

- SECRET - KHMEO -

~~SECRET EDITION~~ ~~REF ID: A6444~~
[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
19 Jun 61
DIST: O/D

SPANISH-SPEAKING PILOTS TRAINING AT TRENCIN AIRFIELD, CZECHOSLOVAKIA,
ON 31 MAY 1961

Training of at least four Spanish-speaking pilots at Trenčín airfield (46-26N 18-61E) was noted in Czechoslovak air-ground communications (VHF voice) on 31 May 1961. The nationality of the pilots has not been determined; study continues, however.

Between 1631Z and 1730Z these pilots were in continual contact with the Trenčín airfield tower control (callword TENOR-1) on a frequency allocated to the 46th Bomber Division/S341, Prerov (49-26N 17-25E); the pilots used suffixes (714, 797, 794, and 790) from a block probably allocated to the unidentified ground attack unit at Trenčín, which is believed to be subordinate to S341.

It is noteworthy that during this activity the Spanish-speaking trainees apparently engaged in air-to-air communication, as evidenced by the following transmission:

<u>Time</u>	<u>To</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>Text</u>
1727Z	TENOR-1	790	794 [is at] altitude 3000 meters [in the] zone; permission to carry out maneuver....

This is the first time that air-to-air communication between Spanish-speaking trainees has been noted.

Two pilots speaking Czech and using pilot suffixes (B-VAL 7D6) and 91 (presumably VD1) were also active during the same period. Although they made reference to zones "A" and "B," suggesting tactical activity, there was no indication that they were working together or with the Spanish-speaking pilots. However, a study of voice characteristics discloses that Spanish may not be the native tongue of one of the pilots who used that language, suggesting that he may have been a Czech using Spanish to facilitate training commands.

For information on previously observed activity by Spanish-speaking pilots at Trenčín, recipients of [REDACTED] 1 Feb 61, should refer. (DIST:
OSCAR/DELM.; PLUS CCU PONTIACLEAU.)

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 1 PAGE

- SECRET MI610 -

~~SECRET~~ SABRE

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

ELECTRICAL RELEASE
30 Jun 61
DIST: [REDACTED]

SOVIET FREIGHTERS SCHEDULED TO CALL CUBA IN JULY 1961

1. The following Soviet freighters have been scheduled for loading sugar in Cuba during July 1961:

<u>Ship</u>	<u>Loading Period</u>
BALTIJSK /	10 - 20 Jul
LESOZAVODSK /	10 - 20 Jul
DEPUTAT LUTSKIY /	15 - 25 Jul
AL'MET'EVSK /	15 - 25 Jul
KURA /	20 - 30 Jul
ALAPAEVSK /	20 - 30 Jul
MICHURINSK /	20 - 30 Jul
KUBAN /	25 Jul - 5 Aug
IZHEVSK /	25 Jul - 5 Aug

2. On 27 June 3954 tons of cargo for Cuba had been loaded aboard the DEPUTAT LUTSKIY in Leningrad. Included in the cargo were 24 cases weighing a total of 34,295 kilograms described as An-2 aircraft, and 17 cases weighing a total of 2,345 kilograms described only as aircraft.

(DIST: [REDACTED])

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS ONE PAGE

~~SECRET~~ SABRE

~~1. Basic National Security Policy~~
2. Classified Doc. relating to Sec. 1 Jan 1962

163 p. paper outlining BNSP - the paper makes no clear reference to the use of COMINT etc., however, it could be useful in dealing with this case - by giving the feeling of our National Parks back thus putting the stage of COMINT in greater perspective

Sec. 2

contains BNSP - short version - and papers relating to

Sec. 3

Critical Planning Tasks

11 April 1962

Funnel Messages:

Military and/or technical advisers
were believed to be in Cuba (msgs.
dated 11 April 62 and 17 Aug 62).

See

23 July 62
and

Note: One Grigoriy Maishevich
Pereshyn and wife arrived in

Processing - Cuban Crisis '62

AGO 10234

302241Z Oct 62

Blake to Klocker

States that NSA's first priority requirement - is reaction reporting in connection w. high and low level reconnaissance flights.

Physical facilities at enables only very limited processing there.

Includes proposal to establish at a facility capable of intercept processing and reporting of Cuban tactical air and Cuban air defense communications.

(green notebook)

30 Oct 1962

SIGINT Intercept units:

will originate
COMINT-derived advisory warnings.

* TS Navy Department Msg - A61 54337
From CNO → CINCLANT, 30 2324Z
Oct 62.

In-Flight Advisory Warning Plan

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12813
by Director, NSA/CSS, GS
Jan date 20 Apr 98

30 October 1962

In a DIRNSA message to COMUSAFSS (Klocko), Lt. General Blake, USAF, advised the following course :

1.
2. Colonel _____ of your staff has just completed a briefing for members of my staff in which he outlined the requirements of CINCONAD and CINCAFLANT for COMINT support to enable them to fulfill their responsibilities. Although we have received no formal statement of requirement as outlined by Colonel there is no question about the validity of the requirement to keep CONAD and CINCAFLANT currently advised of the Cuban Air situation. I feel, however, that our first priority requirement is reaction reporting in connection with high and low level reconnaissance flights. Our problem is that limitations very in physical facilities at _____ enables us to do only limited processing there. The processing capability presently on board enables us to meet in a barely adequate fashion the requirement for reaction reporting, in order to perform the analysis necessary to meet the requirements of CONAD and AFLANT, we would have to double our present analytic effort at
3. We can however, provide a very limited response to these requirements by adding a small number of Air Force personnel familiar with these requirements to the complement at _____ operating under the control of OIC, _____ and permitting these individuals to pick off as a by-product of our limited processing in support of the reaction reporting that information which would also satisfy CONAD and AFLANT to the extent possible. When the processing is not engaged in supporting reaction reporting, we will direct the OIC, _____ to satisfy the requirements of CONAD and AFLANT to the extent possible.
4. It is our understanding that the information produced as a result of the arrangements outlined above would be passed over a communications circuit to MacDill AFB where it would be relayed to the other Air Force

consumers. Pertinent information could also be passed by appropriate secure means to CONAD Control Center

5. I have been advised that we have received the authority to move in to Therefore, as longer term solution to our problem, I would propose to task the [Army with establishing ?] a facility capable of intercept processing and reporting of Cuban tactical air and Cuban Air Defense Communications. Based on our preliminary information it would appear that, in addition to the personnel required to perform the mission outlined above, there may be space to intercept and process some portion of the Cuban Military Problem. If so, I might further propose a co-located Army-Air Force facility

[Note: General Kloc's comments on the interim and longer term solution
/ Kloc's
we solicited by Gen. Blake in this message.*]

* (TSC) DIRNSM Mag to COMUSAFSS, DTG 302241Z, 10234/30.

27. Cuban Crisis

a. During the Cuban crisis, D3 personnel were assigned to JCS J-3 Battle Staff at the Pentagon to ~~keep~~ keep NSA, Fd. Meade, apprised and up to date on all significant collateral data relating to the Cuban crisis. Present planning is for D3 personnel to return to Battle Staff for duty if the crisis is re-awakened.

b. Arrangement was made with JCS J-3 to provide for automatic inclusion of NSA representation when future crises dictate reviving the Joint Battle Staff. Project Officers names were exchanged (for NSA, for JCS) and the individuals have been in contact.

c. D3 maintained a constant watch over all SIGINT support plans and implementing actions during the Cuban crisis, as well as the up-dating of CINCLANT and corresponding Component plans.

(2)

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR

4

ACTION PRECEDENCE		INFO PRECEDENCE	SPECIAL HANDLING	COMINT CHANNELS		DISTRIBUTION
PRIORITY	PRIORITY					
FROM USAFSS			DATE 06 NOV 62	INFO	A	5
TO AFSSO USAF	STRIKECOM				B	3
AFSSO CONAD	AFSSO CCC				B1	2
AFSSO SAC	CINCLANT				B11	4
AFSSO TAC					C	6
INFO JCS (JRC)	AFSCC				C1	4
DIRNSA	6940TTW				C11	5
NAVSECGRU	DIRNAVSECGRULANT				DRF	2
ASA					D31	4
					D32	4
					P04	5
					NSACP	1
					D3EXEC	1
					AFSS	3
					ADNSG	3
					B1101-1	
					B1401-1	

~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

ODD 6-11-66.

AFSCC EMERGENCY REACTION UNIT NR 1) BECOMES OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVE
070500Z NOV. UNIT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLECTION, PROCESSING AND
REPORTING COMINT AND ELINT INFORMATION ON THE CUBAN AIR PROBLEM.
COMMUNICATIONS ROUTING INDICATOR ASSIGNED TO THE UNIT.
BECOMES EFFECTIVE IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. AS SOON AS CIRCUIT TO NSA
BECOMES OPERATIONAL. PENDING THIS, SHOULD BE UTILIZED.
REQUEST BE ADDED AS RECIPIENT OF REPORTS DEALING WITH
IMPENDING RECONNAISSANCE OPERATORS IN ORDER THAT RECON REACTION
REPORTING WILL BE MEANINGFUL TO CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES. REACTION
REPORTING WILL BE DISSEMINATED ON AS NEAR REAL-TIME BASIS AS
POSSIBLE. COMPLETENESS AND ACCURACY WILL BE COMMENSURATE WITH
PRE-FLIGHT AND POST-FLIGHT SUPPORT INFORMATION WHICH IS PROVIDED.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT 1200Z

2

PAGE 1 OF 2

AGEN NR

55036

ACQ NR

REF ID: A

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

BY

ADD

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

062030Z

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

P

~~SECRET~~

in Havana in Dec 1961 on a
Service passport (cellular Source
4 May '62).

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY NR. *M142*

ACTION PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

INFO PRECEDENCE

NOTE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SPECIAL HANDLING

TOP SECRET CHANNELS

REF ID: A6142

FROM: DURNSA DATE: 13 APRIL 1962

TO: CUSASA

~~CONFIDENTIAL - COMINT CHANNELS~~

D32/ 494/62

NY 192244Z JAN AND 1000 262126Z JAN RELATIVE TO:

INTEGRATED ANALYST

OVERSEAS TOUR EXTENDED TO

AUGUST 63.

REF ID: A6142	
D32	1 - 4
DRF	5 - 6
D302	7 - 8
B	9 - 10
B2	11-16
POL	17-22
PO2	23-24
M351	25-27
ABALINGP (FM)	28-29
M6142	30-31

DRAFTER

/D322/3781-S

/ACTING CHIEF/D32/

RELEASED AT (20120)

132113 3

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

AGC NR.

AGO NR.

0428013

DTR 132330Z

REFERS TO MESSAGE

AGO 01226/1R5W

AGI

DTO 192244Z JAN 262126Z JAN

SUSPENSEMINT NONE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

HANDED VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13 April 1962

D32/494/62

M/R: Previous correspondence to CUSASA, Serial N 2516, dated 20 Nov 61 questioned need for replacing _____ upon expiration his tour in August 1962. ASA reply dated 4 January 1962 stated need for replacement. Referenced message proposed that _____ be extended for one year during which time ASA would supply a MS or senior NCO to be trained at NSA as replacement. Subsequent messages acquired agreement to one year extension. This message informs ASA of extension. Coordinated with ASALMOP. This message constitutes final reply to M6 RS #113.

D32/494/62 3/13 April 1962/bg

c.c. M6142



HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~SABRE~~

NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING

[REDACTED]
18 APRIL 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

O/L1370-62

REFERENCE TO RADAR TRACKING ON RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT IN CUBA

Between 13 and 17 April 1962 radar tracking activities were mentioned in Cuban internal plaintext communications. These were accompanied by references to equipment designators which, in the past, have equated to known Russian radar sets.¹ This is the first occurrence noted of references to either radar tracking or to Russian radar equipment in Cuban internal traffic.

On 13 April 1962 a schedule was published that mentioned P-20 and P-8 "sets" [REDACTED]. Initial analysis suggested these were radio sets. Subsequent research revealed that P-20 and P-8 are Russian-made non-communication emitters, and that the schedule was a radar search schedule for them. P-20 and P-8 have been given the US nicknames TOKEN and KNIFEREST A.

~~SECRET~~ ~~SABRE~~

[REDACTED]
2 May 62

SECRET
(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

[REDACTED]
2 May 62

DRY CARGO SHIPMENTS TO AND FROM CUBA IN SOVIET SHIPS
1 January - 31 March 1962

1. During the first quarter of 1962, 43 Soviet dry cargo ships made 43 voyages to Cuba delivering at least 228,000 metric tons of cargo excluding military cargo.^a These ships also transported approximately 370,000 metric tons of Cuban sugar and 2,238 tons of nickel concentrate to the USSR. Although the number of voyages during the quarter remained on a par with the first quarter of 1961, the tonnage delivered in 1962 represented an approximate increase of 50 percent over the known tonnage for that same period in 1961. It also represents the largest number of known tons of cargo shipped to Cuba in Soviet ships for any quarter since shipments began. The following table shows the number of shipments and minimum amounts to Cuba monthly.

<u>Month</u>	<u>Number of Calls</u>	<u>Tons Delivered</u>
January	13	66,689
February	17	85,484
March	13	76,085
Totals	43	228,258

2. The cargo ship SEVASTOPOL' [UQJE] was noted departing the Baltic on 25 December 1961 with an unknown cargo and arriving in Havana on 26 January 1962. However, it is estimated it arrived at an unknown Cuban port, possibly Mariel, on or about 14 January and departed on or about 25 January. This ship may be one of two ships reported unloading military equipment including armored tanks at Mariel 12-15 January and may also have unloaded four motor torpedo boats at Havana on 26 or 27 January (these four MTB's are not reflected under military cargo in the table in paragraph 6).

3. In addition to the above-mentioned cargo ships the Soviet expeditionary ship VLADIMIR OBRUCHEV [UDOK] arrived at Havana on 18 January after leaving Odessa on 20 December 1961 where it loaded diving suits before departing. Before arriving in Cuba it declared for Nicaro with a cargo of fuel oil; however, it proceeded directly to Havana. This ship remains in Cuba engaged in undetermined operations as of the writing of this report.

4. Of special significance is the arrival in Cuba during the first quarter of 1962 of at least eight motor torpedo boats and five KRONSHTADT-class patrol vessels, all of which departed from Murmansk. The TBILISI [UQUL] and the KOLKHOZNIK [UPLF] each carried four MTB's on deck and towed a patrol vessel. The BALTIJSK [UVHY], BRATSK [UJAC], and L'GOV [UQMV] each towed a patrol vessel in addition to carrying other cargo.^b

a. See paragraph 6 for known military cargo delivered.

b. See paragraph 6 for further details.

SECRET

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCTRINATED RECIPIENTS))

Page 1 of 17 Pages

SECRET

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

5. The Soviet tanker SLAVGOROD [UCDR], which departed Feodosiya 5 January and arrived at Havana 23 January, carried six motorized cranes on deck in addition to hauling a cargo of gas oil. (The cranes are included in the cargo list under paragraph 6. See [REDACTED] for additional details on FOL shipments).

6. The following table shows known tonnages and types of cargo delivered.

<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Item Count</u>	<u>Tonnage (Metric Tons)</u>
Asbestos		700
Automotives:		
buses	33	--
buses-PAZ652	2	--
cars	35	--
cars	3	5
dump trucks-MAZ205	72	508
tractor trucks-KRAZ221	24	202
trailer	1	6
trucks-GAZ63	47	147
trucks-KRAZ219	9	100
trucks-MAZ2000 (with trailers)	42	294
trucks-MAZ2000	29	180
trucks-MAZ2000B	16	48
trucks-ZIL164	22	920
truck(approx. a 10-ton truck)	1	--
spare for PAZ642 buses	29 cases	--
spare (unspecified)	151 cases	11
vehicles	30	240
vehicles	126	--
vehicles	---	3080
vehicles-GAZ69	28	66
Books (composition)	500,000	--
Brick		188
Cement (white)		4342
Chain		11
Chemicals:		
ammonium nitrate		11,698
ammonium sulfate		7,968
borax		20
caffeine		4
caustic potash		10
chemicals (unspecified)		525
citric acid		5
dinitrotoluene		10
hexametaphosphate		23
isopropyl		8
methanol		31
potassium bichromate		11
potassium nitrate		956
reagents		6
soda		1,000
sodium chloride		5

SECRET

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDECTRINATED RECIPIENTS))

SECRET
(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Item Count</u>	<u>Tonnage (Metric Tons)</u>
sulphur		5,226
super phosphates		14,221
urea		1,737
trinitrotoluene		163
Coal		20
Condensed milk		232
Cotton		1,170
Dye (blue)		4
Dynamite		74
Dynamite fuze (fire fuze)	50,000 meters	--
Equipment:		
bulldozers	58	927
cranes	5	106
cranes (automatic)	18	--
diesels with spares	4	--
drilling equipment		4
excavators	4	--
graders	2	29
moulds		41
moulding machines	15	90
moulding machines (model 703M)	10	34
technical equipment		1,462
tractors-MTZAT5M	6	--
unspecified equipment		369
Geodesy radio equipment		3
Grain (including barley, corn, flour, maize, oats, and wheat)	65,800	
Grease tanks	50	4
Gum resin		171
Industrial oil		250
Metals:		
cast iron ingots		266
construction metal		2,570
lead ingots		206
metal		1,136
rolled iron		800
steel		2,837
tinplate		1,455
titanium tubes (length-5400 millimeters)	50	--
wire		34
Medicines:		
medical equipment		4
pharmaceutical products		8
Military cargo:		
AV-50 propellers	12	--
crates (possibly ammunition)	4-	--
motor torpedo boats	8	--
patrol vessels-KRONDSHTADT class	5	--

SECRET

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCTRINATED RECIPIENTS))

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

<u>Cargo</u>	<u>Item Count</u>	<u>Tonnage (Metric Tons)</u>
portable radar van and five ton truck	1. each	--
T-3 $\frac{1}{4}$ tanks	2	--
tracked artillery vehicles	2	--
Paper:		
kraft sack paper		259
newsprint paper		99
Power cables		65
Rubber		25 \varnothing
Sunflower seed		1,448
Unspecified cargo (may include some or all of unlisted tonnages of above cargo except military cargo)		58,279
Wood:		
lumber	5,209 standards	17,983
railway ties	61,918 ties	3,870
woodpulp		11,224
	Total	228,258

7. The following chart provides details of Soviet dry cargo ships calling at Cuban ports during the first quarter of 1962. (Dates, ports, and tonnages appearing in parentheses are estimated.)

SECRET

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCTRINATED RECIPIENTS))

Page 4 of 17 Pages

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET SABRE~~

CHART

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

DRY CARGO SHIPMENTS TO AID FROM CUBA IN SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS
1 January - 31 March 1962

SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DOA	DOD	METRIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED		REMARKS
						METRIC TONS	CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	
LABINSK/ [USSR, 660GT]	Odessa/13 Dec	9377 tons cargo consisting of 5559 tons meat, 3852 tons flour, 5 cranes-156 tons, 63 tons equipment	Havana/ Cabanillas/ Nuevitas	4 Jan 15 Jan 24 Jan 15 Feb	16 Jan 23 Jan 15 Feb	13396		Unloaded sugar at Helsinki, Finland.
BOL'SHEVI/ [URSS, 660GT]	Leningrad/ (17 Dec)	1459 tons sulphate, 1399 tons soda, 253 tons rubber, 330 tons equipment, 350 tons rolled iron, 41 bulldozers (650 tons) and 120 motor vehicles, 252 tons condensed milk	Havana Isabella de Sagua Nuevitas	7 Jan 25 Jan 25 Jan 13 Feb	19 Jan 25 Jan 13 Feb	13521		To unload sugar at Odessa and Nikolaev. May also have carried 123 passengers to the Soviet Union.
SEVASTOPOL/ [USSR, 747GT]	Baltic/25 Dec	Jinmon	Unknown	(14 Jan) 25 Jan 2 Feb 12 Feb	(25 Jan) 2 Feb 12 Feb 23 Feb	9496		This ship is probably one of the two ships reported unloading military equipment, including armored tanks, at Mariel/12-15 Jan. May have unloaded 4 MBS's at Havana on 26 or 27 Jan. Departed for Leningrad with sugar.

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCRINATED RECIPIENTS))

Page 5 of 17 Pages

~~SECRET SABRE~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

CHART

SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS			DCA	DOD	METRIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
			Harera / Jucaro / Muelas / Pastellito	15 Jan 17 Jan 25 Jan 25 Jan	2 Feb 13 Feb 31 Jan	8000			
ALAPAEVSK / [URU, 545GT]	Riga / (18 Dec)	1250 tons super phosphates; 1325 tons general cargo, including 3200 cases vodka, 620 cases champagne, 225 cases wine	Harera / Jucaro / Muelas / Pastellito	15 Jan 17 Jan 25 Jan 25 Jan	2 Feb 13 Feb 31 Jan	8000			Unloaded sugar at Kaliningrad.
FIZIK IZBETY / [URU, 1261GRT]	Odessa / (31 Dec)	25-34 teams, 1 portable radar van and 5-ton truck, 2 tracked artillery vehicles, 1 large truck (approximately 13 tons), undetermined number of crates (possibly ammunition)	Mariei / Harana / Antilla / Moc / Mueritas	15 Jan 17 Jan 25 Jan 20 Feb	16 Jan 19 Feb 1 Mar	14751			Declared empty when departing Black Sea. Unloaded military cargo at Mariei. Departed Cuba for Odessa with sugar.
TEITIST / [UCU, 751GRT]	Akhangel'sk / 15 Nov	1392 standards of timber (200 tons), 3339 tons wood pulp, 4 motor torpedo boats. Also towed 1 KRONSTADT-class patrol vessel to Cuba.	Harana / Antilla / Moc / Mueritas	17 Jan 7 Feb 20 Feb	5 Feb 15 Feb 1 Mar	8863			To unload sugar and nickel concentrate at Murmansk. Approximately 1000 tons nickel concentrate was loaded at Moc.
METALLURG BAIKOV / [URU, 1231GRT]	Odessa / 5 Jan	2919 tons unspecified cargo	Nicaro / Nicaro / Cienfuegos	21 Jan 24 Jan 3 Feb	23 Jan 3 Feb 15 Feb	10959			Declared for Constanza with 4500 tons general cargo when transiting Bosphorus. To unload sugar at Black Sea port.

~~SECRET~~

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCTRINATED RECIPIENTS))

Page 6 of 17 Pages

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

CHART

SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS			METRIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED			REMARKS
			DOA	DOD	SUGAR SHIPPED				
USTIIZHIA / [UL'KA, 5628GT]	Nikolaev / 3 Dec Odessa / 3 Jan	6144 tons wheat	Havana / Mayadas /	22 Jan 26 Jan	25 Jan 8 Feb	6571			Bulkered at Odessa en route Cuba. To uniced sugar at Black Sea port.
LENINOGORSK / [UITY, 3935GT]	Constanta / 1 Jan	6582 tons corn and 2245 tons wheat	Havana / Santiago / Cumanesca / Santiago	24 Jan 2 Feb 17 Feb	21 Jan 9 Feb	1533			Delayed for Odessa with sugar.
DEPUTAT LIFSKII / [LUTIC, 9935GT]	Nikolayev / 31 Dec Odessa / 8 Jan	9106 tons general cargo, including 3 tons seedless radio equipment	Havana / Santiago 28 Jan	23 Feb	23 Feb	9999			To uniced sugar at Odessa and Nikolaev.
MICHURINSK / [VOZ, 5518GT]	Baltijsk / 12 Jan	3880 tons including 800 tons ammonium sulphate; remaining space was loaded with motor ve- hicles.	Havana / Manzanillo / Manzanillo	29 Jan 13 Feb	11 Feb 27 Feb	859			To uniced sugar at Nikolayev.
MARSHEL GOVOROV / [UKAZ, 5550GT]	Leningrad / 13 Jan	6349 tons consisting of 3277 tons general cargo for Havana, including 525 tons chemicals, 4 diesels with spare parts and 3072 tons ammonium nitrate for Gienfuegos	Havana Santiago Guantanamo	31 Jan 10 Feb 28 Feb	8 Feb 19 Feb 28 Feb	745			Returned to Leningrad with sugar.

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCTRINATED RECIPIENTS))

SECRET CHART

SECRET

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING) SECRET

卷之三

SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS			METRIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED			REMARKS
			DCA	SOD	SUGAR	CUBAN			
PRIMI / [USSR, 950GT]	Leningrad / 16 Jan	3503 tons cargo for Havana, including aliphatic oil, electrical equipment, tools, domestic appliances. Also 1117 tons ammonium nitrate for Cienfuegos.	Havana / Cienfuegos / Tunas de Zaza / Santiago /	21 Jan 12 Feb 15 Feb 17 Feb 5 Mar	13 Feb 15 Feb 14 Mar 5 Mar	19901	To unloads sugar at Vladivostok. Took on bunker at Santiago before departing for Far East.		
KRAZNOGRAD / [USSR, 9500GT]	Estimated 23 Jan	2120 tons general cargo for Havana, including 1000 tons oats, 26 buses, 12 automatic cranes, 11 bulldozers (170 tons), 4 excavators, 6 motor vehicles. Also 956 tons potassium nitrate for Cienfuegos.	Havana / Cienfuegos / Cuba / Santa Cruz del Sur	17 Feb 17 Feb 17 Feb 7 Mar	15 Feb 24 Feb 5 Mar 12 Mar	13311	Embarked 13 passengers at Cuba for the USSR. Returned to Baltic with sugar.		
CHERKASOVSK / [USSR, 5400GT]	Qassa / 23 Jan	7200 tons wheat	Havana Santiago Santiago	9 Feb 21 Feb 7 Mar	21 Feb 7 Mar	808	Despatched for Leningrad with sugar.		
ASHOL'D / [USSR, 1176GT]	Baiven, China 31 Dec	6976 tons lumber (1354 standards)	Panzanillo	25 Feb	24 Feb 11 Mar	9423	Passed through Panama canal at beginning Feb en route Cuba. To un- load sugar at Baltic ports.		

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-THOUGHTPROVOKED RECIPIENTS))

Page 8 of 17 Pages

~~SECRET SAFFIRE~~

SECRET
(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

CHART

SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DOA	DOD	METRIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
IVAN POLZUJOV [UVMR, 7176GT]	Leningrad / 13 Jan	3262 tons various cargo, including 7 buses, 35 cars, 10 tons dinobutylene, 85 tons trinitrotoluene, 74 tons dynamite, 50,000 meters fire fuze, and 500,000 com- position books	Havana /	11 Feb	11 Mar	9498	To return to Leningrad with sugar.
LIGOVY / [UQMV, 5382GT]	Leningrad / 24 Dec Murmansk / 7 Jan	2460 tons ammonium sulphate, 30 vehicles, 240 tons, 1 trailer, 6 tons. Also towee 1 KRONSTADT-class patrol vessel to Cuba.	Navaia / Casilda /	9 Feb 23 Feb	21 Feb 3 Mar	6666	Departed for Katingrad with sugar.
PRIRIHKH ZHOLIO KIURI [UQDP, 12285GT]	Odessa / 24 Jan	13670 tons consisting of 1170 tons cotton, 3484 tons maize, 1614 tons barley, 250 tons indus- trial oil, 849 tons steel, 20 tons coal, 266 tons cast iron ingots, 34 tons wire, 11 tons chain	Barana / Jucaro / Cienfuegos /	11 Feb 8 Mar 21 Mar	5 Mar 20 Mar 25 Mar	14994	This is a new ship on her maiden voyage. Returned to Odessa with sugar.

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCTRINATED RECIPIENTS))

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

CHART

SECRET

SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS			METRIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED		REMARKS
			DCA	DOD	SUGAR SHIPPED			
BRATSK / [UTAC, 5518GT] [UOV3, 7212GT]	Leningrad / 23 Dec (22 Jan) Kurmansk /	3816 tons general cargo including 1820 tons in holds and deck cargo of 2 cases of 18 tons each, 1 case 25 tons, 1 case 14 tons, and 2 cases 12.5 tons each, for Havana. Additionally 1882 tons ammonium nitrate for Santiago. Also towed 1 KRONSTADT-class patrol vessel to Cuba.	Havana / Santiago / Guantanamo / Santiago	12 Feb 22 Feb 28 Feb 7 Mar	29 Feb 27 Feb 7 Mar 15 Mar	7806	Departed for Baltic with sugar.	
MILUKOV / [UOV3, 7212GT]	Kirovsk / 5 Jan Leningrad /	566 tons wood pulp	Havana Manzanillo Santiago	13 Feb 14 Mar 19 Mar	1 Mar 18 Mar 23 Mar	9497	Passed Panama Canal 9 Feb. To unload sugar at Far East ports.	

(DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCTRINATED RECIPIENTS)

SECRET
NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION

CHART

SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS			METRIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED			REMARKS
			DCA	DOD	SUGAR SHIPPED				
BERDYANSK / [UIMP, 5436GT]	Leningrad / 31 Jan	7476 tons cargo for Havana including 1399 tons white cement, 657 packages of steel-1176 tons, 1326 cases in slate-91½ tons, and 342½ tons ammonium nitrate.	Mantanzas / Havana / Cardenas / Nariel /	21 Feb 19 Mar 20 Mar 23 Mar 28 Mar 31 Mar	19 Mar 20 Mar 23 Mar 28 Mar 31 Mar	1999			This ship had a collision with the Italian ship S.S. Tolosa at position 53°16'N 33°43'E at 1642Z Feb. It then continued voyage to Cuba and was scheduled to transfer a patient to the tanker LIEPATA [UML], probably in vicinity of Santa Maria Island, Azores. To return to Baltic with sugar.
VOLKHOGES / [UPXC, 5494GR]	Arkhangel'sk / 24 Jan	2819 tons wood pulp, 23 PAZ 205 dump trucks / (185 tons), 2 PAZ 652 buses, 29 cases of spares 20 PAZ 652, 6 MRZAT50 tractors /	Havana Puerto Padre / Monatí /	23 Feb 11 Mar 16 Mar 16 Mar 18 Mar	13 Mar 16 Mar 18 Mar	6193			Vehicles loaded at Murmansk. To unload sugar at Baltic ports.
STANISLAVSKIY / [UUNQ, 3179GT]	Odessa / 1 Feb	1462 tons technical equipment.	Havana Antilla /	23 Feb (25 Feb) 26 Feb	28 Feb	5146			To unload sugar at Tallin. This ship declared for Africa and subsequently went to Cuba.

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCTRINATED RECIPIENTS))

SECRET
(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

CHART

SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS			DOA	DOD	METRIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
			NAVARA	ISABELLA de Sagua	MATANZAS				
DIRKIJ DONSKOJ [URDF; 596GT]	Kaliningrad / 27 Jan (7 Feb)	1186 tons ammonium sulfate 8219 tons cargo consisting of 3225 tons grain and 4994 tons general cargo	Havana / Isabella / de Sagua	24 Feb (18 Mar) 25 Mar 13 Mar	17 Mar 23 Mar 29 Mar	24 Mar	29 Mar	8452	Departed for Murmansk with sugar.
DVINOGORSK / [UASH, 720GT]	Mitolaev / Leningrad / 29 Dec 2 Feb	4685 tons cargo including 10 "molding machines (50 tons). Also carried a KRONSHTAADT-class patrol vessel to Cuba.	Havana Isabella de Sagua Cebuaniem	25 Feb 9 Mar 17 Mar	9 Mar 17 Mar 25 Mar	24 Mar	29 Mar	3412	Departed for Cessa with sugar.
BALTIJSK / [UVR, 5585GT]	Murman / Leningrad / 29 Dec 2 Feb	1607 tons lumber (1963 standards)	Casilda / Cienfuegos	28 Feb (11 Apr) 11 Apr	(11 Apr) 14 Apr	28 Mar	6 Apr	7858	After departing Baltic for Cuba, this ship turned north and made a stop at Murmansk where it took this shipchaser in tow for Cuba. To unload at Baltic port.
STEPAN RAZIN / [UAK, 7176GT]	Vladivostok / Dairen, China	6007 tons lumber (1963 standards)						3564	Departed for the Baltic with sugar.
ALEKSANDROVSK / [UWZU, 5419GT]	Leningrad / (9 Feb)	2234 tons ammonium nitrate for Cienfuegos and 2028 tons general cargo includ- ing 966 tons white cement for Havana	Havana Cienfuegos	28 Feb 23 Mar	22 Mar 6 Apr	29 Mar	319		Departed for Baltic with sugar.

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCTRINATED RECIPIENTS))

~~SECRET SABRE~~

CHART

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

SECRET

SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DOA	DOD	METRIC TONS SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
KOLKHOZNIK / [USSR, 7148GT]	Leningrad / (29 Dec) Murmansk / (1 Feb)	Towed one KRONSHADT-class patrol vessel and carried 4 MTB's on deck. 800 tons unspecified cargo.	Havana / Succar /	1 Mar 29 Mar	17 Mar 1 Apr	950	After departing Baltic for Cuba, this ship made a stop at Murmansk where it loaded the MTB's and dock the submarine in bow. On 45 February, while approaching Cuba, it transferred 74 tons of bunker to the patrol vessel. To return to Leningrad with sugar.
ALIANT'EVOK / [URSS, 5419GT]	Riga / Ventspils / 13 Feb	3200 tons general cargo	Reykjavik / Port Moresby / Vlora /	3 Mar 14 Mar 22 Mar	14 Mar 23 Mar 24 Mar	9527	To Leningrad sugar to Minsk.
SRETENSK / [USSR, 5419GT]	Leningrad / 18 Feb	3908 tons cargo including 8 tons pharmaceuticals, 1 ton autos, 5 welding machines, 3rd tons, 123 tons con- struction metal	Grenada / Tunis / Zava / Santiago /	3 Mar 15 Mar 21 Mar	14 Mar 23 Mar 31 Mar	9523	To unload sugar at Leningrad. After 5 days delay at Tunis de Zava, this ship loaded in Santiago.
IZHEVSK / [USSR, 5513GT]	Leningrad / 18 Feb	4659 tons cargo consisting of 854 tons white cement, 6 bulldozers-95 tons, 2 graders-29 tons, 173 tons urea, 78 tons trinitrotoluene,	Havana / Santa Cruz / del Sur	8 Mar 19 Mar	15 Mar 23 Mar	7900	To return to Leningrad with sugar.

((DETACH FFIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCRINATED RECIPIENTS))

Page 13 of 17 Pages

~~SECRET SABRE~~

SECRET
(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

CHART

SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS			METRIC TONS		REMARKS
			DCA	DOD	CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	Metric Tons	REMARKS	
IZHEVSK (Cont'd) URZHUM / [UFTI, 5623P]	Nikolaev (17 Feb)	171 tons gum resin, 323 tons oats, 42 MAZ 200 trucks with trailers, (294 tons) 22 ZIL 154 trucks, 92 tons, 47 GAZ/ GAZ 59 vehicles, 61 tons 6030 tons cargo, including 515 tons wheat, 835 tons maize, 1136 tons metal, and 2447 tons construction metal.	Havana / Antilla /	13 Mar 16 Mar 25 Mar	14 Mar 25 Mar	7613	To return to Black Sea with sugar.	
ATKARSK / [UWAD, 5523P]	Leningrad 21 Feb	5024 tons cargo including 812 tons steel, 541 tons tilplate, unknown cargo of 676 packages, 718 tons, 188 tons brick, 3 cars, 5 tons, 4 tons drilling equipment, 4 tons blue dye, 2250 tons ammonium sulfate, 11 tons potassium bichromate, 4 tons medical equipment, 5 tons citric acid, 29 tons borax, 31 tons methanol,	Havana / Matanzas /	11 Mar 24 Mar	23 Mar 7 Apr	8139	Departed for Kaliningrad with sugar.	

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCTRINATED RECIPIENTS))

SECRET

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

CHART

SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS			DOD	METRIC TONS SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
			CUBA	CUBA	CUBA			
ATMARSK (Cont'd)	SOLNECHNOGORSK [USSR, 9935GT] [JULY, 5500GRT]	Nikolaev / (12 Feb) Odessa / 24 Feb	3 tons isopropyl, 23 tons hexametaphosphate, 6 tons resinates, 749 tons asbestos	Havana / Isabella / de Sagua / Juventud /	14 Mar 28 Mar 1 Apr 4 Apr	27 Mar 31 Mar 1 Apr 4 Apr	15175	Departed for Odessa with sugar.
KEDROVORK / [USSR, 5500GRT]	Ventspils / 7 Feb Riga / 23 Feb	5234 tons consisting of 5226 tons sulfur / 24 KARAZ 221 trucks / 252 tons, 9 KARAZ 219 trucks / 120 tons, 16 MAZ 200B trucks / 48 tons, 49 MAZ 235 trucks / 323 tons, 29 MAZ 210 / trucks - 180 tons, 50 tanks for grease - 4 tons, 151 cases spare parts - 11 tons, 41 tons molds; 99 tons newsprint paper.	Havana / Mo / Manzanillo /	15 Mar 19 Mar 28 Mar	17 Mar 27 Mar 13 Apr	7562	This ship made voyages to Cuba as a replacement for the DIMITRI POZHARETS. Sulfur was loaded at Ventspils and vehicles at Riga. To return to Black Sea with sugar and 1238 tons nickel concentrate - 250 barrels.	

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCTRINATED RECIPIENTS))

SECRET

SIGMET
(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

CHART

SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DCA	DOD	METRIC TONS CUBAN SHIPPED	SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS	
KISLOVODSK / [UWR, 5419GT]	Liepaya / Leningrad 27 Feb	5573 tons cargo including 1448 tons sunflower seed, 263 tons lead ingots, 65 tons power cables, 811 tons oats, 259 tons kraft sack paper, 1162 tons white cement, 4 tons caffeine, 5 tons sodium chloride, 2 GAZ 69 cars, 5 tons equipment 9 tons, 13 model 703M molding machines 34 tons	Havana / Cabanas / Mariel /	18 Mar 27 Mar 31 Mar 9 Apr			8585		Sunflower seed was loaded at Liepaya, other cargo at Leningrad. To return to Baltic with sugar.
IVAN MOSKVIN / [UKP, 3385GT]	Novorossijsk / 26 Feb	61,918 railway ties valued at \$356,443.15-(3873 tons)	Santiago / Antillo /	13 Mar 14 Apr 23 Apr		5125		Departed for Baltic with sugar. Loading of sugar aboard this vessel was delayed due to creosote odors.	
KUBAN / [UOV, 7185GT]	Nikolaev / Odessa /	7530 tons corn and wheat	Havana / Preston / Nicaro /	18 Mar 23 Mar 31 Mar 7 Apr		9613		Made a stop at Conakry 23 Feb where she unloaded two heavy weights weighing 72 tons each. Departed for Havana on or about 3 March. To carry load of sugar to Vladivostok.	

SECRET

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCTRINATED RECIPIENTS))

Page 16 of 17 Pages

~~SECRET~~

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

CHART

SHIP	PORT(S) AND DATES OF DEPARTURE	CARGO	CUBAN PORTS	DCA	DOD	METRIC TONS CUBAN SUGAR SHIPPED	REMARKS
LENINSKIJ / KOMSOMOL [USSR, 12916GT]	Knerson / 27 Feb (Odessa) / 5 Mar	13021 tons superphosphate Nikolaev / 1 Mar	Mariel / Ciempeso / Iquero / Manzanillo / Santiago /	23 Mar 12 Apr 23 Apr 26 Mar	6 Apr (9 Apr) (7255)	Departed for Black Sea with sugar.	
UGLEURAL'ISK [USSR, 5628GT]		4150 tons wheat, 1912 tons flour.			20 Apr	6520	Departed for Black Sea with sugar.

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCTRINATED RECIPIENTS))

~~SECRET~~

~~S~~~~E~~~~C~~~~R~~~~I~~~~T~~~~-S~~~~A~~~~B~~~~R~~~~E~~

NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING

[REDACTED]
17 MAY 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

0/12502-62

CUBAN AIR FORCE VHF COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURE

The object of this report is to provide a preliminary analysis of Cuban aircraft and ground control procedures and terminology as they are reflected in tactical and civil air communications. Primary emphasis is placed on Cuban tactical air communication procedure where possible, but tactical and civil air terminology appear to overlap. Military pilots and civilian pilots use approximately the same terminology to describe or refer to operations or equipment common to both. Cuban weather terminology follows general Spanish language usage.

A tentative resemblance has been discovered between a known Russian system of aircraft plotting and one being used by the Cubans. This plus the fact that the Cuban Air Force is largely equipped with Russian-built tactical airplanes manned by bloc-trained pilots suggests that as Cuba's Air Force communications develop they will probably do so along bloc lines. Tactical training is definitely underway and preliminary linguistic analysis of intercept from it establishes the participation of non-Cuban control personnel. While the pronunciation and accent of these controllers seems to be Slavic or Middle European and several samples of Russian voice have been processed, [REDACTED] no firm generalizations regarding the predominant nationality of these advisors can be made at this time.

COMINT reflections of Cuba's present tactical air capability are somewhat contradictory. Several mentions of formation flying have occurred, but no information could be derived regarding the purpose or size of the formations. There has been at least one instance of a readiness run-through procedure associated with what appeared to be a scramble launch or simultaneous airplane launching exercise. This involved at least 7 airplanes. During the exercise the control officer suddenly interrupted to admonish "all pilots" to gently lift their crafts' noses on takeoff. While it seems unlikely that pilots engaged in scramble exercises would require such a warning, this probably reflects the fact that the Cuban Air Force is developing under forced draft conditions. This may

~~S~~~~E~~~~C~~~~R~~~~I~~~~T~~~~-S~~~~A~~~~B~~~~R~~~~E~~

- SECRET - SABRE -

[Redacted]

also explain the lack of uniformity apparent in certain basic procedures. Altitudes are reported in either feet or meters and ground control personnel have been heard asking pilots which was being used.

Voice transmissions are acknowledged by both air and ground personnel in a variety of ways. While a disregard for straight book procedure is not uncommon among veteran pilots and communications personnel, it is felt that the inconsistency of terminology among Cuban personnel might be attributed to their newness at this type of operation.

Other tactical items observed have been limited references to practice bombing and at least one conversation mentioning the launching of anchored target balloons for aerial gunnery practice.

There is little or no information available regarding the location of these activities. Communications security has been very well maintained through a system of cover words and/or callsigns.

- SECRET - SABRE -

~~-SECRET-~~ SABRE

NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING

18 JUNE 1962
CORRECTION NO 1 TO

17 MAY 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION:

0/12502-62

1. Change reference number to 0/12937-62.

Page 1 of 1 Page

~~- SECRET - SABRE -~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~SABRE~~

ELECTRICAL RELEASE
5 Jun 62
DIST: [REDACTED]

SECRET
(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

5 Jun 62

NEW SOVIET CARGO SHIP EN ROUTE CUBA WITH POSSIBLE MILITARY CARGO

1. The new Soviet cargo ship BELORETSK [USMZ], built in Copenhagen and subsequently noted in underway trials off Norway in the latter part of April 1962, is now en route Cuba from Arkhangel'sk via the Great Circle route.
2. The BELORETSK bunkered at Murmansk before departing for Arkhangel'sk, where it arrived on or about 10 May, and is estimated to have departed as late as 28 May. It was scheduled to load 2500 standards of sawn timber; however, only 1670 standards (approximately 5240 metric tons) were loaded. Its announced cargo-carrying capacity is 14,150 metric tons and its estimated gross tonnage is 10,300 tons. The 1670 standards of lumber is the only known cargo on board and appears to be a relatively light load for a ship of this size when compared with the DEKABRIST [UOML, 7176GT] which delivered 5583 metric tons of lumber to Cuba in April and the ORENBURG [UYXII, 11050EGT] with 10,013 metric tons (3189 standards) of sawn timber on board now en route Cuba. It is therefore believed that the BELORETSK may be carrying a partial load of military cargo following a pattern similar to the cargo ships BALTIJSK, BRATSK, L'GOV, KOLMZOZNIK, and TBILIST, all of which carried MTB's and/or towed patrol vessels to Cuba from the Murmansk area (see 0/6856-62 and 0/9480-62). It is not felt, however, that this ship is towing a patrol vessel as the SOA has been as high as 19 to 20 knots.
3. The last-reported position on the BELORETSK was 49-48N 37-36W at 031500Z June.

SECRET

((DETACH PRIOR TO RELEASE TO NON-INDOCTRINATED RECIPIENTS))

(DIST: [REDACTED])

Page 1 of 1 Page

J546

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
6 June 1962
DIST: [REDACTED]

FIRST ELINT EVIDENCE OF SCAN ODD RADAR IN
CUBAN AREA

ON 1 MAY 1962 A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN THE CUBAN AREA INTERCEPTED SIGNALS FROM THE SOVIET AIRBORNE INTERCEPT RADAR, SCAN ODD. THIS CONSTITUTES THE FIRST ELINT EVIDENCE OF THE PRESENCE OF ANY SOVIET AIRBORNE INTERCEPT RADAR IN THE CUBAN AREA. THE SIGNAL DISPLAYED NORMAL PARAMETERS OF 2125 PPS AND AN 8-BAR RASTER SCAN. AT THE TIME OF THE INTERCEPT THE MISSION AIRCRAFT WAS ON AN EASTWARD COURSE ABOUT 40 NM SOUTH OF THE WESTERNMOST TIP OF CUBA. THE BEARING OF THE INTERCEPT IS UNKNOWN DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE SIGNAL WAS IN THE BACKGROUND OF ANOTHER SIGNAL ON WHICH BEARINGS WERE BEING TAKEN. THE RADAR WAS IN THE SEARCH MODE AND IT DID NOT APPEAR TO FOLLOW THE MISSION AIRCRAFT. THE INTERCEPT OF SCAN ODD SIGNALS HAS BEEN ANTICIPATED FOR SOME TIME BECAUSE OF THE REPORTED PRESENCE OF BOTH MIG 17 AND MIG 19 AIRCRAFT IN THE CUBAN AREA. SCP-3

DIST: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~ SABRE

NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING

[REDACTED]
19 JUNE 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

0/13991-62

CUBAN AIR FORCE LONG-RANGE FLIGHTS

The following item dated 182030Z Jun 62 is released by NSA as received from the field:

1. Pilot chatter referring to wing tanks on 16 June 1962 may provide evidence Cuban Air Force jet fighters have long-range capabilities ((A)), and that pilots are becoming more adept in aircraft handling. This suggestion is based on the following:

During a training flight on 16 June, one pilot (suffix 31) experienced difficulty switching from one wing tank to the other, causing his right wing to dip. An unknown station asked 31 if his aircraft was controllable, and if not, to drop his tank. The pilot replied that he was in full control of his aircraft, and subsequently requested and was granted permission to enter the traffic pattern. The pilot was definitely Cuban, and may be considered experienced in that at no time did he appear to lose control of his situation.

2. In context with above it was also noted that a "Buddy system" seems to be in effect in the Cuban Air Force, in that while pilot 31 was having difficulties, he was in constant communications with only one other pilot (suffix 41). Shortly before being cleared for landing, he established communications with suffix 61.

((A)) [REDACTED] COMMENT: The ranges of MIG planes are:

MIG - 15 NATO Code Name: "Fagot"

Normal range: 896 km (560 miles)

Range with external tanks: 1,370 km (840 miles)

MIG - 17 NATO Code name: "Fresco"

Normal range: 820 km (510 miles)

Range with external tanks: 1,860 km (1,160 miles)

MIG - 19 NATO Code Name: "Farmer"

Normal range: 965 km (600 miles)

Range with external tanks: 1,370 km (850 miles)

Page 1 of 1 Page

~~SECRET~~ SABRE

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
22 JUNE 1962
DIST: [REDACTED]

ELECTRONIC INTERCEPTS IN CUBAN AREA

ANALYSIS OF RECENT ELINT MISSIONS IN CUBAN AREA REVEALS THAT THERE MAY BE AS MANY AS 13 TOKEN/TOKEN VARIANTS, 13 KNIFE REST A/RUS 2, 6 FIRE CANS, POSSIBLY ONE LANDBASED SO-1 AND SEVERAL SOVIET SHIPBORNE RADARS INCLUDING SO/SF/SKIN HEAD, NEPTUNE, AND BALL GUN OPERATING IN THIS AREA. INTERCEPTS OF AIRBORNE RADARS CONSIST OF THE AT TYPE SCAN ODD. SCAN ODD IS INSTALLED IN CERTAIN MODELS OF THE MIG 17 AND MIG 19. DEFENSE OF HAVANA APPEARS TO BE THE PRIME CONCERN JUDGING FROM THE HEAVY RADAR DEPLOYMENT IN THAT VICINITY. THE SECONDARY AREA OF CONCENTRATION IS SANTA CLARA IN THE CENTRAL PORTION OF THE ISLAND. A POSSIBLE ROCK CAKE/STONE CAKE HEIGHT-FINDER WAS REPORTED EARLIER, BUT NO ADDITIONAL ELINT EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE. THE V-BEAM CAPABILITY OF THE TOKEN IS PROBABLY THE ONLY SOURCE OF HEIGHT DETERMINATION POSSESSED BY CUBA AT PRESENT. THE BAR LOCK/BIG MESH WHICH WAS SUSPECTED HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY ELINT. ON ONE MISSION AN INTERCEPT WAS MADE OF A SIGNAL WHICH HAD PARAMETERS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN DEVELOPED RADAR, WOOD GAGE. THE RADAR IS TENTATIVELY CARRIED ON THE CUBAN COAST NEAR CAJIO ($22^{\circ} 43' N$ - $82^{\circ} 26' W$). DIST: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

PAGE ONE OF ONE PAGE.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET//EIMRO~~

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
28 JUNE 1962
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

NIGHT FLIGHTS OF CUBAN JET AIRCRAFT

On 19 June 1962, intercept of the Cuban Military Air tactical communications reveals that the Cuban Air Force is flying Jet aircraft during the hours of darkness. Between 0115 and 0406Z (2015 and 2306 Cuban Local Time), a ground controller, probably located at San Antonio de los Banos, was active in contact with seven aircraft pilot suffixes.

COMMENTS: This is the first firm evidence that night flights of jet aircraft are being conducted by the Cuban Air Force. On 23 May 1962, a pre-flight message was passed scheduling jet practice flights as late as 0400Z (2300 local). However, no fulfillment of this schedule was noted. See [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//EIMRO~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

ZCZKRU 187KA 4 184

PP

DE

67

P 191653Z

JUL

1962

FM DIRNSA

TO CNO

DIRNAVSECGRU

INFO CINCLANT

CINCLANTLT

DIRNAVSECGRULANT

JCS

SSO DIA

/NSA REP CINCLANT

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS ADP/104~~

1. NSA HAS BEEN DIRECTED BY SEC DEF TO ESTABLISH A SIGINT COLLECTION CAPABILITY IN THE VICINITY OF HAVANA CUBA AS A MATTER OF THE HIGHEST INTELLIGENCE PRIORITY AND TO INITIALLY DIVERT THE USS OXFORD FOR THIS PURPOSE.

DIRNSA HAS INITIATED ACTION TO OBTAIN THE SERVICES OF AN MSTS SHIP FOR THIS PURPOSE TO BE OPERATIONAL NOT LATER THAN 1 DEC 1962.

2. SINCE FULL CAPABILITY OF OXFORD CANNOT BE UTILIZED EFFECTIVELY IN HAVANA AREA, REQUEST CNO ASSIGN SHIP TO RELIEVE OXFORD AS AN INTERIM MEASURE UNTIL MSTS CONTRACT SHIP IS AVAILABLE. NSA WILL INSTALL SPECIALIZED EQUIPMENT SIMILAR TO THAT USED ON

SHIPBOARD SPACE REQUIRE-

MENTS ARE SIMILAR.

3. FOR DIRNAVSECGRU. IF INTERIM SHIP REQUESTED CANNOT BE MADE AVAILABLE, AND ON STATION BY 15 AUG, REQUEST OXFORD BE DIRECTED RETURN OPAREA OFF HAVANA ON COMPLETION SAN JUAN VISIT 8-14 AUG. SHOULD THIS DIVERSION BE EXPECTED TO EXTEND FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME REQUEST THE NECESSARY ADJUSTMENTS BE MADE IN THE REMAINDER OF THE CURRENT ITINERARY FOR OXFORD

1440 1440

19/1713Z JUL

~~TOP SECRET COMINT CHANNELS ADP/104~~

ACT G-51.....

INFO G-50....G-20....FOLDERS.....

S14

~~C100~~

NNNN

~~TOP SECRET~~

SAN JUAN 08-14 AUG

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

RETURN TO G53

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 13526
by Director, NSA/CSS, CGP
Date 20 Oct 98

14 July 1962

G - GU - 630 - GSD Op-91 1G50B

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

Op-9221/dnk
Ser 550/000294

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Subj: Navy Participation in Increased SIGINT Program for Cuba (S)

Ref: (a) SECDEF memo of 16 July 1962, subj: Increased SIGINT Program for Cuba (S)

1. Reference (a) directs that the Naval Security Group (Op-94G) realign its resources to provide greater coverage of Cuba "in response to highest priority intelligence requirements." NSG has been aware of this development for several days and is determining how best to carry out the directive.
2. The degree of impact which the directed actions will have on naval intelligence collection is not yet known. Inevitably some loss will occur, but every effort is being made to keep it to a minimum. NSG is exploring with the Director, National Security Agency such things as having the other services assist with the increased manning against Cuba wherever possible.
3. The increased effort against Cuba directed by the Secretary of Defense will require approximately 20 officers and men at [redacted] and [redacted]. It is not anticipated that any military construction will be required, since it is planned to rehabilitate existing facilities at [redacted] and to utilize vans at [redacted]
4. It is understood that DIENSA will arrange directly with COM MSTS for the MSTS ship and that the SIGINT effort will be manned by Army personnel.
5. The interim arrangements for shipborne intercept will extend until about 1 December 1962 and will probably require use of a Navy ship. CINC-LANTFLT is being requested to comment on the feasibility of utilizing an auxiliary type operating out of [redacted]
6. The Deputy Director of Naval Communications for NAVSECNSU (Op-94G) will continue to coordinate all arrangements for implementation with the Director NSA.

CNA CONTROL # - 2625

Page 1 of 1 page
Copy 2 of 6 copies

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

128
DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12810
by Director, NSA/Chief, CGS
Ryan date 20 Apr 98

ELECTRICAL RELEASE

24 Jul 62

DIST:

UNUSUAL NUMBER OF SOVIET PASSENGER SHIPS EN ROUTE CUBA

1. At the present time there are at least four, and possibly five (the ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV), Soviet passenger ships en route Cuba with a possible 3335 passengers on board. Three of these ships departed Baltic ports and two departed Black Sea ports. Following is a summary of the passenger ships en route or possibly en route Cuba (all information on the three ships departing the Baltic is estimated):

	<u>Departed</u>	<u>Last Known Position</u>	<u>Passengers on Board</u>	<u>ETA Cuba</u>
MARIYA ULYANOVA / [ULGH, 4871GT, PAS]	Kaliningrad 10 Jul	Within 40 n.m. of 23-48N 63-06W at 231612Z	340	26 Jul
KHABAROVSK / [UUYW, 4871GT, CG]	Leningrad 10 Jul	32-55N 45-35W at 221500Z	740	26 Jul
MIKHAIL URITSKIJ / [ULGF, 4871GT, PAS]	Riga 12 Jul	Within 60 n.m. of 30-06N 53-30W at 231700Z	340	28 Jul
LATVIYA / [UYYB, 4871GT, PAS]	Black Sea 13 Jul	Within 60 n.m. of 32-00N 49-00W at 240500Z	365	28 Jul
ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV [UKDD, 15206GT, PAS]	Odesa 16 Jul	37-26N 06-11E at 211500Z	1540	1 Aug

2. Available information indicates that the KHABAROVSK and the MIKHAIL URITSKIJ were to make voyages to Vladivostok; however, it is not known at this time whether these ships will proceed to the Far East via the Panama Canal after departing Cuba or whether the Vladivostok voyage announcements are deceptive measures to conceal Cuban voyages. The ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV and the LATVIYA both declared for Conakry when departing the Black Sea. However, the LATVIYA is tracking toward Cuba and it is considered likely that the ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV will follow suit.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS TWO PAGES

~~SECRET//KINMO~~

[REDACTED]

ELECTRICAL RELEASE

3. Since 16 July the KHABAROVSK and the MIKHAIL URBITSKIJ have been recipients of high precedence [REDACTED] messages which may indicate these two ships are [REDACTED] engaged in other than routine activities.

(DIST: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//KINMO~~

~~TOP SECRET//DIPL~~

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
31 Jul 62
DIST: [REDACTED]

POSSIBLE REFLECTIONS OF SOVIET/CUBAN TRADE ADJUSTMENTS
NOTED IN MERCHANT SHIPPING

1. An analysis of current Soviet shipping to Cuba reveals that: (a) a considerable number of Soviet merchant ships en route from the Black Sea to Cuba have been declaring for South African ports with very low cargo tonnages; (b) a number of ships from the Baltic (also estimated to be traveling light) were proceeding toward Cuba; and (c) there has been a recent absence of [REDACTED] traffic which normally reflects the departure dates and cargo/tonnage data of Soviet ships scheduled for Cuban voyages.
2. The following details are available on these ships probably en route Cuba. Read in 6 columns: Ship [C/S]/Tons Declared/Cargo Capacity/Port Declared/Probable Destination/Area of Departure.

DUBOSSARY' [UBFN]/965/8718/Conakry/Cuba/Black Sea
DIVNOGORSK' [UQHII]/760/12000/Gibraltar/Cuba/Black Sea
F.Z. KYRUL' [UQDP]/1400/14500/Conakry/Cuba/Black Sea
K. ZELENSKIJ' [UYOL]/1650/14600/Gibraltar/Cuba/Black Sea
N. PIROGOV' [UVPT]/1295/1000/Takoradi/possibly Cuba/Black Sea
OMSK' [UQYZ]/1600/14000/Ghana/Cuba/Black Sea
POLTAVA' [UUDQ]/1270/11000/Ghana/Cuba/Black Sea
M. KURAKO' [UERM]/2350/14500/Conakry/Cuba/Black Sea
F. KURCHATOV' [UYOM]/1131/----/Ghana/possibly Cuba/Black Sea
LENINOGORSK' [UIWY]/915/11880/Conakry/possibly Cuba/Black Sea
MEDNOGORSK' [UQHJ]/1325/11880/Accra/possibly Cuba/Black Sea
ALAPAEVSK' [URL]/unknown/6500/none/Cuba/Baltic
ALEKSANDROVSK' [UVZU]/unknown/6500/none/Cuba/Baltic
L'GOV' [UQMW]/unknown/6500/none/Cuba/Baltic
SRETENSK' [UIWQ]/unknown/6500/none/Cuba/Baltic

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS TWO PAGES

~~TOP SECRET//DIPL~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE

3. On 25 July, the Soviets announced the sailing of a large group of Soviet agricultural specialists and students to Cuba aboard the Soviet passenger ship ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV. This is one of the four out of five passenger ships now en route or already in Cuba which declared for various other ports (two for South Africa and two for Vladivostok - [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(DIST: [REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

ELECTRICAL RELEASE
7 Aug 62
DIST: [REDACTED]

FURTHER UNUSUAL SOVIET/CUBAN TRADE
RELATIONS RECENTLY NOTED

1. In addition to the Soviet cargo ships reported earlier as en route or possibly en route Cuba [REDACTED] at least two more, the F. VAVILOV [UYU, 12090GT] and the UMAN' [UIFH, 5628GT], have departed the Black Sea declaring for Conakry with low cargo tonnages reported and are presently en route Cuba. Also, there is an indication that three more Soviet merchant ships are following the same general pattern. These are: (a) KHMURG VISHNEVSKIY [UYOK, 12016GT], which declared for Accra with 1300 tons of "General" cargo; (b) METALLURG BARDIN [URDP, 12285GT], which declared for Conakry with 1438 tons of "General" cargo; and (c) METALLURG DAIKOV [UWQU, 12017GT], which declared for Casablanca with 140 [sic] tons "General" cargo. It is estimated that these ships may be en route Cuba. Additionally, the cargo ships AL'MET'EVSK [UKKB, 5419GT], BALTIJSK [UVHY, 5585GT], and the IZHEVSK [UICP, 5513GT], which departed the Baltic with unknown cargoes; and the KURA [UYSM, 4048GT], which departed the Black Sea with 2427 tons of grain, are also presently en route Cuba. No unusual circumstances surround these last four ships.

2. Four of the cargo ships reported earlier, as possibly, are now definitely determined to be en route Cuba, i.e., the N. PIROGOV, F. KURCHATOV, LENINOGORSK, and the MEDNOGORSK.

3. Thus far in the 3rd quarter of 1962, 21 Soviet merchant vessels representing 134,107 gross tons (plus 3 possible candidates totaling 36,888 gross tons) are either en route or have arrived in Cuba from the Soviet Union. The following chart provides figures for comparison purposes of tonnages arriving from the USSR (NOTE: Figures represent gross tonnage of vessels involved, not of cargoes actually delivered):

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS THREE PAGES

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE

	<u>3rd Qtr 61</u>	<u>4th Qtr 61</u>		<u>1st Qtr 62</u>		<u>2nd Qtr 62</u>	
July	54,183	Oct	82,596	Jan	103,134	Apr	105,836
Aug	44,576	Nov	36,389	Feb	109,862	May	133,953
Sep	52,798	Dec	64,938	Mar	83,708	Jun	100,362
Total:	151,557		183,923		296,704		348,151
Average	50,519		61,307		98,901		113,383

4. The criteria for originally reporting this activity were: (a) the relatively large number of ships departing the Black Sea and declaring for various ports on the African continent (port and cargo declarations from ships departing the Baltic are not normally noted; therefore, any assumptions attributing anything out of the ordinary to their activity is purely conjectural); (b) the fact that they all declared very low cargo tonnages in comparison with their known cargo capacities; and (c) a distinct lack of [REDACTED] regarding cargoes and ports of departure/arrival. It must be cautioned, however, that diversionary port declarations by individual ships are not considered extraordinary. In this instance, the fact that so many ships within such a short period of time seemed to be employing this gambit was felt to be noteworthy. Indeed, it might have been considered even more extraordinary if all the ships had plainly declared for Cuba.

5. Therefore, when evidence became available which tended to explain the facts in other than military terms [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] some of the apparently extraordinary aspects of this merchant activity could reasonably be explained: (a) the light loading of the vessels might be a reflection of a Soviet inability to furnish industrial/agricultural materials to the Cubans; (b) the military equipment already in Cuba was in excess of what was needed or could be paid for; therefore, the ships were needed to export the material from Cuba (an unprecedented occurrence); and (c) little [REDACTED] traffic would be expected if the ships were not carrying anything but the stated cargo tonnages.

~~TOP SECRET EDITION~~

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE

6. There is some evidence to substantiate an assumption that at least some of these ships may be carrying military cargo. It has been past experience that the Soviets generally attempt to conceal military shipments by such means as declaring it "Varied" or "General" cargo. At least nine (not including the three possibilities noted in paragraph 1) of these vessels did, in fact, make such declarations which permits the assessing of a certain amount of the cargo to be possibly military.

7. However, it is considered that any assumptions concerning a general increase or a rapid acceleration of transport of military equipment from the USSR to Cuba is to be treated with extreme reserve.

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET EDITION~~


~~SECRET~~

ELECTRICAL RELEASE
17 AUGUST 1962
DIST: [REDACTED]


WHIFF RADAR IN CUBA

THREE INTERCEPTS OF A SIGNAL DISPLAYING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOVIET AA FIRE CONTROL RADAR, WHIFF, HAVE BEEN REPORTED EMANATING FROM CUBA. D/F BEARINGS INDICATE DEPLOYMENT IN THE HAVANA AREA. THIS IS THE FIRST INSTANCE OF INTERCEPT OF SIGNALS OF SUFFICIENT DETAIL, STRENGTH, AND DURATION TO PERMIT CONFIRMATION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF THIS EQUIPMENT TO CUBA. THE REPORTED PARAMETERS WERE AS FOLLOWS:


SIGNAL 007A



SIGNAL 008A



SIGNAL 015A



ALTHOUGH THE REPORTED PARAMETERS OF THE INTERCEPTED SIGNALS ALSO MATCH THOSE OF FIRE DISH, THE DEPLOYMENT OF FIRE DISH HAS BEEN VERY LIMITED; THEREFORE, WHIFF IS THE EQUIPMENT MOST LIKELY IN USE.

THE INTRODUCTION OF WHIFF RADAR DOES NOT QUALITATIVELY IMPROVE CUBA'S ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE CONTROL CAPABILITY, INASMUCH AS THE WHIFF IS SLIGHTLY INFERIOR IN TRACKING RANGE TO THE FIRE CAN WHICH IS ALREADY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

DEPLOYED QUITE EXTENSIVELY IN THE HAVANA, CUBA AREA. DIST: [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Page two of two pages.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ELECTRICAL RELEASE

23 Aug 62

DIST: [REDACTED]

STATUS OF SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPPING TO CUBA

1. A continued increase in the number of Soviet merchant vessels en route Cuba, lightly loaded, and declaring for various ports other than Cuba, has been noted. Since mid-July a total of 57 Soviet merchant ships have made voyages to Cuba or are currently estimated to be en route Cuba. This figure includes three ships (and possibly a fourth) which are making their second trip to Cuba since mid-July. These are the passenger ships M. URITSKIJ, KHABAROVSK, M. ULYANOVA, and possibly the LATVIYA.

2. The following details are known concerning Soviet merchant vessels which have completed cargo deliveries to Cuba and have not heretofore been reported. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Read in six columns: Ship [Callsign]/Gross Tons/Tons Declared/Port Declared/Area of Departure/Cargo Aboard.

1. SEVASTOPOL' [UOJE]/7176/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/2 patrol vessels, 4-6 trucks, and concealed equipment
2. LESOZAVODSK [UQIS]/9820/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/1 helicopter, boats
3. KIROVSK [URTM]/9254/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/xxxx
4. KRASNOGRAD [UQOX]/9500/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/xxxx
5. SOVETSKAYA GAVAN' [UJMP]/7176/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/xxxx
6. DVINOLES [UYSA]/4638/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/xxxx
7. ATKARSK [UVAD]/5411/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/Army trucks and boats on deck
8. SEVEROLES [UERL]/4638/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/16 vans, crane trucks, one large crate
9. BOL'SHEVIK SUKHANOV [UJYP]/6660/8803 wheat/Cuba/Black Sea/5 Army vans
10. KIROVSK [UICO]/5518/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/6311 tons general cargo including 39 GAZ-63 trucks
11. KISLOVODSK [UIWR]/5419/xxxx/xxxx/Baltic/26 trucks on deck, 10 large covered crates

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS TWO PAGES

~~SECRET~~

ELECTRICAL RELEASE

3. The following details are known concerning ships which are presently en route or believed to be en route Cuba. Read in seven columns: Ship [Callsign]/ Gross Tons/Tons Declared/Port Declared/Probable Destination/Area of Departure/ Cargo Aboard.

1. M. URITSKIJ [ULGF]/4871/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
2. KHABAROVSK [UUYW]/4871/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
3. M. ULYANOVA [ULGH]/4871/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
4. NIKOLAEVSK [URST]/4871/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
5. LATVIYA [UYYB]/4871/310 passengers/Conakry/possibly Cuba/Black/xxxx
6. GRUZIYA [UPOV]/11030/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
7. M. BAIKOV [UWQU]/12017/1400 general/Casablanca/Cuba/Black/trucks and cranes
8. DOLMATOVA [UYSB]/7265/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Black/15 trucks and fuel tanks
9. BELORETSK [USMZ]/10300/1700 general/Accra/Cuba/Black/Army vehicles and cranes
10. I. MECHNIKOV [UPVW]/5865/1260 general/Le Havre/Cuba/Black/xxxx
11. STAVROPOL [UQQT]/2780/2000 general/Conakry/Cuba/Black/xxxx
12. M. GAVOROV [UKAZ]/5058/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
13. B. KHMEL'NITSKIJ [UPKP]/7351/1469 Technical Mach./Mediterranean for orders/ xxxx/Black/xxxx
14. N. BURDENKO [UPVY]/5042/1423 general/Ghana/Cuba/Black/xxxx
15. ORENBURG [UYXH]/11058/1450 rubber/Ghana/possibly Cuba/Black/xxxx
16. P. BONIVUR [UVZV]/1078/1608 general/Le Havre/possibly Cuba/Black/xxxx
17. MICHURINSK [UOSB]/5518/xxxx/xxxx/possibly Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
18. USOL'E [UIFK]/5628/xxxx/Cuba/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx
19. LABinsk [UQIR]/6660/1375 general/Casablanca/possibly Cuba/Black/xxxx

[REDACTED]
24 AUGUST 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

REFLECTION OF SOVIET BLOC PILOTS/TECHNICIANS IN CUBAN AIR FORCE TRAINING

(1 MAY - 4 AUG 62)

COMINT sources reveal Russian and non-Cuban voice activity on Cuban Revolutionary Air Force tactical frequencies since 1 May.

Concentrated efforts have been made by Bloc pilots and controllers to converse entirely in Spanish but, on occasion, they have reverted to their native tongue to convey a difficult command or request to other Bloc pilots or controllers. In only one recorded instance has a Bloc pilot requested a Cuban controller to speak more slowly because he was unable to understand.

In practically all noted CRAF major operations or new training techniques a Bloc pilot, most probably Russian, has been observed as the flight instructor or as an observer on hand to assist and advise as necessary. See [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

The following gives a breakdown of all non-Cuban voice activity noted on the Cuban Air Force Tactical nets:

Dinomes indicate pilot suffixes.

SAB stands for San Antonio de Los Banos, SC for Santa Clara, CAM for Camaguey.

(T) denotes tower, (GCI) denotes ground control intercept, (DF) denotes direction finder, and (GCA) denotes ground control approach.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
1 May	--	24	[REDACTED] (Field comment: Sounds non-Cuban and appears to be Int. Idr.)
1 May	SAB (T)	02	S A (slowly-accnt)
3 May	SAB (T)	10	S A
6 May	SAB (T)	10	S A
6 May	10	SAB (T)	S A
6 May	S C (T)	02	S A
6 May	S C (T)	10	S A

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
6 May	SAB (T)	10	SPOKE RUSSIAN
6 May	10	SAB (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
6 May	02	10	SPOKE RUSSIAN
6 May	10	02	SPOKE RUSSIAN
7 May	SC (T)	02	S A
7 May	SC (DF)	02	S A
10 May	--	02	SPOKE RUSSIAN
10 May	CAM (T)	02	SPOKE RUSSIAN
10 May	02	CAM (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
10 May	CAM (T)	82	S A
10 May	CAM (T)	81	S A
11 May	SAB (T)	03	S A
11 May	47/36	CAM (T)	S A
11 May	SC (T)	32	S A
11 May	21	CAM (T)	S A
11 May	SC (GCI)	23	SPOKE RUSSIAN
11 May	23	SC (GCI)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
11 May	80	CAM (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
11 May	CAM (T)	80	SPOKE RUSSIAN
12 May	82	83	SPOKE RUSSIAN
12 May	83	82	SPOKE RUSSIAN
12 May	SAB (T)	02	SPOKE RUSSIAN
12 May	02	SAB (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
12 May	10	SC (T)	S A
12 May	SC (T)	10	S A
12 May	SAB (T)	03	S A
19 May	SC (T)	02	S A
19 May	02	82	SPOKE RUSSIAN
19 May	82	02	SPOKE RUSSIAN
19 May	--	SAB (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
23 May	PLAYA BARACOA (T)	SAB (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
23 May	SAB (T)	PLAYA BARACOA (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
23 May	02/80	CAM (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
23 May	CAM (T)	02	SPOKE RUSSIAN
23 May	CAM (T)	80	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	SC (T)	01	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	01	SC (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	SAB (T)	03	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	03	SAB (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	CAM (GCI)	01	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	SC (GCI)	01	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	01	CAM (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	01	SC (GCI)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	02	SC (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	SC (T)	02	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	SC (T)	30	S A
24 May	SC (T)	50	SPOKE RUSSIAN
24 May	28	33	S A
24 May	33	28	S A
24 May	SC (GCI)	SC (DF)	S A
24 May	01	SAB (GCI)	S A
24 May	02	03	S A
24 May	03	02	S A
24 May	SAB (GCI)	01	S A
24 May	--	30	S A
25 May	03	SAB (T)	SPOKE RUSSIAN
25 May	SAB (T)	03	SPOKE RUSSIAN
25 May	02	03	S A
25 May	03	02	S A
28 May	--	--	HUSS ON 323.0 MCS
29 May	--	--	2 MIN. HUSS 129.9 MCS

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
16 Jun	--	33	SLAVIC ACCENT
19 Jun	--	21	S A
20 Jun	SC (T)	31	S A
20 Jun	SC (T)	30	S A
20 Jun	21	SC (T)	S A
20 Jun	--	SAB (GCT)	S A
22 Jun	50	32	S A
28 Jun	14	56	S A
12 Jul	CAM (T)	88	S A
12 Jul	CAM (T)	84	S A
12 Jul	--	CAM (T)	S A
12 Jul	SC (GCI)	SC (T)	S A
12 Jul	86	CAM (T)	S A
12 Jul	SC (T)	SC (C% GCA)	S A
21 Jul	86	CAM (T)	S A
21 Jul	--	89	S A
25 Jul	SAB (T)	20	S A
25 Jul	CAM (T)	04	S A
25 Jul	CAM (T)	25	S A
25 Jul	CAM (T)	21	S A
25 Jul	66	SC (DF)	S A
25 Jul	87	CAM (T)	S A
26 Jul	89	CAM (T)	S A
31 Jul	73	SC (T)	S A
31 Jul	SAB (T)	50	S A
04 Aug	83	CAM (T)	S A
04 Aug	27	SAB (T)	S A

[REDACTED]
28 AUGUST 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

NIGHT AERIAL GUNNERY EXERCISES BY CUBAN JET AIRCRAFT

Four MIG aircraft were engaged in night aerial gunnery exercises in Pinar del Rio Province on 23 August between 0100Z and 0253Z (2000-2153 EST). At 0204Z one aircraft reported being on course to La Francia (22-31N 83-11W) and at 0220Z he reported his position to be over the first shooting point. At 0253Z he reported landing.

Three other MIG's were active in air/air air/ground communications during this time and are believed to have participated in the exercise.

COMMENTS:

All aircraft were probably from San Antonio de los Banos airbase.

NSA release of report received from [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
31 Aug 62
DIST: [REDACTED]

FURTHER INFORMATION ON SOVIET/CUBAN TRADE

1. An additional 11 Soviet dry cargo vessels [REDACTED] have been noted in COMINT en route or believed to be en route Cuba. This brings the number of Soviet vessels (excluding tankers) going to Cuba to 69 thus far in the third (calendar) quarter, 1962.

2. The following details concerning the additional ships are available. Read in seven columns: Ship [C/S]/Gross Tons/Tons Declared/Port Declared/Probably Destination/Area of Departure/Known Cargo and Remarks.

SVENTENSK [UNZEL]/2352/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/Second trip this quarter.

DIVNOGORSK [UQHII]/8843/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic second trip.

ALEKSANDROVSK [UVZU]/5411/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/Second trip.

AIAPAEVSK [URIL/5411/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/Second trip.

OMSK [UQVZ]/11067/10,900 Gas-Oil/Chains/Cuba/Black/"Barrelej" Gas-oil.

Second trip.

IVAN SECHENOV [UPVU]/5842/1222 Wheat/Casablanca/Cuba/Black/xxxx

KHIMIK ZELINSKIJ [UYOL]/12285/1531 General/Conakry/Cuba/Black/Second trip.

USTYUZHNA [ULCK]/5628/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Black/Towing floating crane.

VOLGOLES [UQIT]/4638/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic/xxxx

DOBROSHI [UYYR]/7625/400 General/xxxx/Cuba/Black/xxxx

FROLOVO [UKRR]/1870/587 General/Casablanca/possibly Cuba/Black/xxxx.

3. The following figures are given for comparison purposes (NOTE: The figures represent gross tonnages of vessels involved, not of cargoes actually delivered):

3rd quarter 61	151,923 GT
4th quarter 61	183,923 GT
1st quarter 62	296,704 GT
2nd quarter 62	340,151 GT
3rd quarter 62 (to date)	518,196 GT

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS 2 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET//DIVA/R~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE

4. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

-2-

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

[REDACTED]
7 SEPTEMBER 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

INCREASED FLIGHT ACTIVITY OF CUBAN TACTICAL AIR FORCE

Since 31 August 1962, when Cuban Air Force communications personnel were placed on a state of alert, an increase in MIG flight activity has been evidenced on air-to-ground communications. Between 1 and 4 September 1962, 76 pilot suffixes were recorded. On 4 September, a total of 43 pilot suffixes were noted active between 1022 and 1659Z (0522-1159 local). Of these, 36 were active in contact with the ground controller at San Antonio de los Banos. Activity consisted of bombing practice and possibly patrol flights. During the same period, seven additional MIG pilot suffixes were noted active with the Camaguey ground controller. No flight activity was noted at Santa Clara, although the ground controllers were active in ground to ground contacts.

COMMENTS: This is the highest number of MIG pilot suffixes recorded since the first intercept of air-to-ground communications on 1 May 1962. The highest number previously recorded was on 20 June 1962, when 31 pilot suffixes were noted active

Source: [REDACTED]

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

ELECTRICAL RELEASE
7 Sep 62
DIST: [REDACTED]

FURTHER INFORMATION ON SOVIET/CUBAN TRADE

1. An additional 8 ships have been noted in COMINT as currently en route or possibly en route Cuba. The following details concerning the additional ships are available. Read in six columns: Ship [C/S]/Gross Tons/Tons Declared/Port Declared/Probable Destination/Area of Departure, and Remarks.

BRATSK [UIAC]/5518/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic

FRIDRIKH ZHOLTO KYURI [UQDP]/12285/2400 general/Conakry/Cuba/Black Sea, 2nd trip

CHERNYAKHOVSK [UQNH]/5400/1911 general/Conakry/possibly Cuba/Baltic, 2nd trip

L'GOV [UQMV]/5382/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic, 2nd trip

KISLOVODSK [UIVR]/5419/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic, 2nd trip

AL'MET'EVSK [UKCB]/5411/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic, 2nd trip

BERDYANSK [UIWP]/5436/xxxx/xxxx/Cuba/Baltic

METALLURG KURAKO [UERM]/12016/2005 general/Accra/possibly Cuba/Black Sea, 2nd trip

2. Current COMINT has also indicated several Soviet merchant ships which are completing or have completed voyages to Cuba. The following details concerning these ships are available. Read in eight columns: Ship [C/S]/Gross Tons/Tons Declared/Port Declared>Date Arrival Cuba/Date Departure Cuba/Area of Departure/Known Cargo.

IGOR VISHNEVSKIY [UYOK]/12285/1300 general/Accra/16 Aug/xxxx/Black Sea/

personnel carrier on deck

BUL'SHEVIK SUKIANOV [UJYP]/6660/xxxx/xxxx/26 July/xxxx/Black Sea/xxxx

USSURIJSK [UYIE]/5628/xxxx/xxxx/17 July/approx. 19 Aug/Vladivostok/general cargo

CHERNYAKOVSK [UQNH]/5400/xxxx/xxxx/15 July/approx 30 July/Baltic/general cargo

SOLNECHNOGORSK [UJVR]/9935/xxxx/xxxx/14 July/12 August/Black Sea/general cargo

3. Three ships previously reported as being possibly en route Cuba have now been definitely established as en route Cuba. [REDACTED] These are the POLTAVA [URDQ], the FIZIK LEBEDEV [UYIV], and the LENINSKIJ KOMSOMOL [UQJM].

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS TWO PAGES

-SECRET//KINBO-

~~SECRET-KIMBO~~

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE

4. Three ships previously reported as being possibly en route Cuba have now been established as being en route ports other than Cuba. [REDACTED] These are the CHERKASSY [UQAL], the FRYAZINO [UOLJ], and the FROLOVO [UKRR].

5. The above figures bring to 87 the total number of Soviet voyages (excluding tankers) to Cuba in third quarter (calendar) 1962. These voyages represent a total of 596,131 gross tons to Cuba thus far in the current quarter. The total gross tonnage to Cuba in the second quarter (calendar) 1962 was 340,151.
(DIST: [REDACTED])

~~SECRET-KIMBO~~

[REDACTED]
11 SEPTEMBER 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

CUBAN MIGS SCRAMBLE ON TWO U.S. NAVY PATROL PLANES

At approximately 1812Z (1212 EDT) 8 September, two Cuban Revolutionary Air Force (CRAF) MIG's scrambled on and intercepted 2 U.S. Navy patrol planes over international waters.

[REDACTED] at 1835Z two Navy S2F patrol planes, S2F-13 and S2F-16, departed in company from the Naval Air Station, Key West, Florida. At 1812Z while both planes were at position [REDACTED], NSA [REDACTED] Ground Control Intercept (GCI) informed S2F-16 of the presence of an unidentified moving radar target 23 miles from S2F-16. The unknown target was reported on a true course of 275 degrees with a speed of 300 knots at 9,000 feet. S2F-16 was flying at an altitude of 5,000 feet. At 1814Z the radar target, tentatively identified by the S2F pilots as a MIG-17, made an overtaking approach on the S2F-16 passing underneath and pulling up in front. When visually sighted the range was estimated at approximately 1,000 yards and opening at high speed. Key West radar further tracked the MIG through a 180-degree turn and observed it making another pass behind the patrol plane. At this time both objects merged on the scope.

At 1834Z while at position 23-16N 82-45W, S2F-16 observed the MIG making gunnery-type runs on the second Navy patrol plane. The MIG passed alongside S2F-13 at an approximate range of 100 feet on the initial run. On the third similar run the MIG, after pulling out, settled in front of the Navy patrol plane at an altitude of 500 feet. The MIG then executed a climbing right-hand turn and disappeared. The Navy pilots reported the MIG as being dark in color without obvious markings to reveal nationality [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
Intercept of the CRAF tactical VHF frequency parallels this activity and reveals that pilots using suffixes 12 and 89 were involved in the GCI alert. Both planes were scrambled and controlled by San Antonio de los Banos GCI.

At 1820Z suffix 12 broke off intercept and returned to base because his fuel was running low. While in flight both 12 and 89 passed a series of numbers, possibly grid coordinates pertinent to the target activity, to the GCI controller.

While in contact with GCI, suffix 89 reported that the target was "presenting combat" and requested authorization to "knock it down." Evidence suggests that his request was denied since no hostile action was initiated.

Suffix 89 was instructed to maintain his position and continue surveillance.

COMMENTS: In direct contrast to previously observed GCI operations, most of the information passed was from the interceptors to GCI. Only a minimum of tracking was required by the intercepting planes, indicating increased proficiency.

The term "presenting combat" used by 89 is not understood but most probably reflects the evasive action taken by the Navy planes.

Source: [REDACTED]

~~TSC~~

11
X Sep 62

From : DIRNSA

To :

~~TOP SECRET DINAR/NORFORC/Limited Distribution~~

ADP / 151 - 62.

Any / all SIGHT evidence of Cuban acquisition
of potentially offensive weapons systems
(e.g., surface-to-surface missiles, bombers,
submarines) will be forwarded electrically
to DIRNSA only at 01 precedence or higher.
Message will contain preamble "This is
a funnel message" and indicate DDI
HDH. No repeat NO further dissemination
is authorized without specific instruction.

— TSC DIRNSA msg, 11 Sep 1962, AGO *

[illeg]

FUNNEL Handling = Indication of possible
Cuban acquisition of potentially offensive
weapons. By 26 Oct 62 - (TSC) New Instruction

"Offensive-weapons messages" (formerly

called "funnel" and controlled).

1. Use regular Service (TS DINAR) and
also place this legend:

also see this legend:

2. Be sure that the OSCAR word does not have on it.
3. Printed in black -
(Both electrical and hard copy must have legend).

FUNNEL

Special

Project involving the forwarding of special Cuban Traffic

See Dtd 17 Oct 62 in compartmented folder.

Per telecon of 7 Nov 62, project no longer active.

SL ext 3596

12 Sep 62

From T543:

(old coverterms index card file)

"compartmented folder" cannot be located

10/92

"Funnel" was apparently ~~as~~ a handling channel for offensive weapons-related reporting. Its Dates, above, were 17 Oct - 7 Nov 1962 -- Probably in response to Pres. Kennedy's restriction on INF. until he made a decision.

However, our "old" Notes "Funnel" in effect by at least 9 October --

~~TOP SECRET~~

17 Sept 1962

1962 SEP 17 22 55

CKHH1040APB 21

RR

DE

14

R 171947Z

FM CNO

INFO CINCLANTFLT

DIRENAVSECGRU

ZEM

P 141442Z

FM JCS WASH DC

TO CNO

ZEM

P 132137Z

FM DIA NSA

TO JCS ATTN JRC

HQ USAF ATTN AFOOR MAJ GEN S W AGEE

INFO SSO DIA ATTN

ZEM

~~TOP SECRET DIR/196/62~~

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO MY DIR/171 (NOTAL) DATED 27 JULY 62, WHICH RELATED TO PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN ACQUIRING A SHIPOBORNE COLLECTION PLATFORM AGAINST CUBAN COMMUNICATIONS. AS AN INTERIM MEASURE, THE USS OXFORD WAS ASSIGNED THE TASK. IT HAS SINCE BEEN EVIDENT THAT THE FULL POTENTIAL OF THE OXFORD APPLIED TO THE PROBLEM HAS BEEN HIGHLY PRODUCTIVE. CONSEQUENTLY, RECONSIDERATION BASED UPON OUR EXPERIENCE FACTOR HAS DICTATED A CHANGE IN REQUIREMENT TO A LARGER VESSEL THAN THE AKL NR 42 MENTIONED IN REFERENCED COMMUNICATION. USA IS THEREFORE COMMENCING NEGOTIATIONS WITH ASTC FOR THE PROCUREMENT OF THE USS MULLER, A VESSEL WHICH CAN APPROXIMATE THE ACCOMMODATIONS AND FACILITIES ABOARD THE OXFORD.

2. I APPRECIATE ALL YOUR EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD AND REGRETE ANY INCONVENIENCE CAUSED BY THIS OPERATIONAL EXIGENCY. S.2-1

1400 1400

14 14 2 SEP

Cub
Cub
G51
G511
G512
G513
G51A
FILE

INFO G-52.... G-53.... GB.... G-51... FOLDERS.....

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 13526
by Director, NSA/CSS, COMINT, COMINT
PNW 20 Dec 98

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]
19 SEPTEMBER 1962
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

NEW RADAR DEPLOYMENT IN CUBA

Signals emanating from western Cuban since 11 September 1962 display characteristics of radars not previously reported in Cuba.

One intercept on 15 September (1623-1635Z) is the first reported signal identified as SPOON REST. Initial D/F bearings cross the Cuban coast about three NM west of Mariel (2259N/8245W). Parameters reported for the SPOON REST are approximately as follows:

RF: 155 MCS

PRF: 350 PPS

PW: 4.5 USEC

SCAN: Irregular (average scan time of 15 SPR)

Also intercepted were BUBB signals from the Havana Harbor area. These emitters are normally located solely along Soviet coastal areas, suggesting a coastal watch or harbor surveillance function. D/F bearings reported 11 through 16 September locate the emitter in the vicinity of 2309N/8221W. The specific function and exact deployment of BUBB has not yet been determined from evidence at hand. Parameters are reported approximately as follows:

RF: 9400 MCS

PRF: 1200 or 600 PPS

PW: .35 USEC

SCAN: 8.0 SPR

COMMENT: SPOON REST radars have been used by the Soviets as target acquisition radars serving SA-2 missile sites. SCP-3

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE
21 SEPTEMBER 1962
DISTRIBUTION: [REDACTED]

IFF SIGNAL IN CUBAN AREA

A signal identified as Soviet airborne transponder, SRO, was intercepted on 18 September 1962, indicating operation of an IFF system in Cuba. The presence of pulse coding in the signal indicates that the transponder was interrogated.

COMMENT: The interrogation equipment is possibly either land-based IFF equipment such as the fist net IFF interrogator or the shipborne yard rake IFF interrogator.

[REDACTED]

SECRET

~~SECRET KIWI~~

ELECTRICAL RELEASE
25 Sep 62
DIST: [REDACTED]

FURTHER INFORMATION ON CARGO SHIPMENTS TO CUBA IN SOVIET SHIPS

1. An additional 13 Soviet merchant ships have been noted in COMINT en route or possibly en route Cuba. The following details concerning these ships are available. Read in six columns: Ship [C/S, Gross Tons]/Area of Departure/Port Declared/Cargo Declared/Known Cargo/Remarks.

BERDYANSK [UIWP, 5436]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/possibly en route Cuba;

second trip

DVINOLES [UYSA, 4638]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/second trip

KASIMOV [Unknown, 9254]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx

GRUZIYA [UPOV, 11030]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/passenger ship; possibly en route Cuba; second trip

BELORETSK [USMZ, 16300]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/2527 metric tons steel/second trip

DEPUTAT LUTSKIJ [UJYQ, 9935]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/1462 metric tons pig iron and steel/xxxx

NIKOLAEVSK [URST, 4871]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/100 passengers sighted on deck/
passenger ship; second trip

DUBOSSARY [UBFN, 7265]/Black Sea/Cuba/3100 tons general/xxxx/second trip

METALLURG BARDIN [URDP, 12285]/Black Sea/Conakry/1707 tons general/xxxx/

second trip; possibly Cuba

SEVASTOPOL' [UOJE, 7176]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/second trip; possibly Cuba

INDIGIRKA [UWEP, 7661]/Arctic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/icebreaker/cargo ship

ORENBURG [UYXH, 11058]/Black Sea/Conakry/1900 tons general/xxxx/second trip;
possibly Cuba

SIMFEROPOL' [UVTG, 6750]/Black Sea/Cuba/2280 tons general/2295 metric tons
flour/xxxx

2. International commercial messages indicate that the BELORETSK, DEPUTAT LUTSKIJ, and SIMFEROPOL' loaded the above-mentioned tonnages of cargo for shipment to Cuba. This type of information has been largely absent from such communications

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS TWO PAGES

~~SECRET KIWI~~

ELECTRICAL RELEASE

during the past three months. During that time, Soviet ships en route Cuba have, in general, attempted to conceal factual cargo information. Previously, however, the loading of specific cargoes for Cuba was often seen in international commercial messages.

3. The icebreaker/cargo ship INDIGIRKA is believed to have made a call at Murmansk on 17 September prior to beginning its present voyage to Cuba. In the past, the majority of ships which have followed this pattern have been carrying [REDACTED] In light and/or towing naval units. [REDACTED] of this fact, the possibility that the INDIGIRKA may deliver naval and/or military cargo to Cuba should not be discounted.

4. Two ships, previously reported as possibly en route Cuba, are now known to be definitely en route Cuba. These are the passenger ship ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV [UKDD] and the cargo ship KRAZNOGRAD [UQOK].

5. The following cargo information, obtained from COMINT and collateral sources concerning ships already reported en route Cuba, is available: (a) IZHEVSK [UICP], 8-16 oil tanks, 6 large wooden crates, 1 truck crane, one 1.5-ton truck, and various types of small deck cargo; (b) LENINOGORSK [UIWY], or 2.5-ton truck, and various types of small deck cargo; (c) ARKHANGEL'SK [UVCO], spare parts for eight 1.5- or 2.5-ton trucks; and (c) ARKHANGEL'SK [UVCO], spare parts for tractors (COMINT).

6. There have been 121 Soviet voyages (excluding tankers) to Cuba thus far in the third (calendar) quarter of 1962. This number represents a total of 872,195 gross tons.

(DIST: [REDACTED])

~~SECRET-KIMBO~~

ELECTRICAL RELEASE
2 Oct 62
DIST: [REDACTED]

FURTHER INFORMATION ON CARGO SHIPMENTS TO CUBA IN SOVIET SHIPS

1. An additional eight Soviet merchant ships have been noted in COMINT en route Cuba since the publication of [REDACTED]. The following details concerning these ships are available. Read in six columns: Ship [C/S, Gross Tons]/Area of Departure/Port Declared/Cargo Declared/Known Cargo/Remarks.

KOMILES [UQIW, 4638]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx

MIKAIL URITSKIJ [ULGF, 4871]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/third trip; passenger ship MARIYA ULYANOVA [ULGM, 4871]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/third trip; passenger ship USSURIJSK [UYLE, 9501]/Black Sea/Acrau/1850 long "technical material"/xxxx/possibly en route Cuba; second trip

ESTONIYA [UYYA, 4871]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/passenger ship

IL'YA MECNIKOV [UPVW, 5865]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/trucks sighted on deck/second trip

NIKOLAJ BURDENKO [UPVY, 5842]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/trucks sighted on deck/second trip

SOBOLEVO [USLZ, 3455]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx

2. Four ships, previously reported as possibly en route Cuba, are now definitely known to be en route Cuba. [REDACTED]

These are the cargo ships METALLURG BARDIN [URDP], SEVASTOPOL' [UOJE], ORENBURG [UYXH], and METALLURG BAIKOV [UWQU].

3. The following cargo and passenger information, obtained from collateral sources, is available on ships previously reported en route Cuba: (a) ATKARSK [UVAD], five liquid storage tanks, six 2.5-ton trucks, an undetermined number of road graders, one cherry picker crane, two large wooden crates; (b) NIKOLAJ PIROGOV [UPVT], four trucks, two cranes, one bulldozer, and other miscellaneous deck cargo; (c) LESOZAVODSK [UQIS], various types of army vehicles, including trucks, on deck; (d) KIROVSK [URTM], five tank trucks, two busses, four light trucks, nineteen large army trucks, three crane trucks, two truck tractors, two large wooden crates,

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS TWO PAGES

~~SECRET-KIMBO~~

~~SECRET~~ KIMBO

[REDACTED]
ELECTRICAL RELEASE

fifty uniformed men; (e) KISLOVODSK [UIWR], sixteen trucks.

4. In [REDACTED] an incorrect callsign and gross tonnage were given for the refrigerator ship SIMFEROPOL' which is currently en route Cuba from the Black Sea. The correct information is as follows: callsign, UEMY; gross tonnage, 5524.

5. The above mentioned ships bring to 129 the total number of Soviet dry

cargo voyages begun and/or completed in the third (calendar) quarter of 1962. This number represents a total of 918,756 gross tons.

(DIST: [REDACTED]).

~~SECRET~~ KIMBO

CROSSREF NUMBER

Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962

FBI Intelligence
Watch Office

2/COM Report

R/D

Plain language Report

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12813
by Director, NSA/CSS, CGS
PLW date 20 Apr 88

C/A Effect

C/A Effect

TOP SECRET DINAR

COPY NR.

2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE
NONE

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: DIA/NSA

DATE: 5 OCTOBER 62

DIR	1
D/DIR	1
ADM	3
ADP	3
B	2
BL	2
C	4
CL	5
D302	3
D32	4
D31	4
DEF	2
D3 RP	2
P02	2
P04/05	6

TO: USAPSS

CUBASA

DIA/NAVSECGRU

INFO: NSA RSP LANT

TOP SECRET DINAR

DIR 205

KURTZ, CRAIG AND KLOCKED FROM BLAKE.

PART I FOR KURTZ.

1. REF IS MADE TO YOUR QUERIES DURING MY VISIT TO YOUR BUSES ON
14 SEPTEMBER 62.

2. INTERCEPT TASKING OF YOUR FACILITIES INVOLVED IN CUBAN PROBLEM HAVE
BEEN EXAMINED AND THE FOLLOWING CAN BE STATED:

(A) ACHIEVING THE REQUIRED REPORTING
CAPABILITY, LOCAL INTERCEPT CONTROL RESPONSIBILITIES WILL BE
INCREASED, ALTHOUGH THE DEGREE OF CONTROL MUST BE REGULATED TO
PRECLUDE DUPLICATION OF COVERAGE AMONG YOUR FACILITIES, ASA, AFSS
FACILITIES ALSO TASKED WITH CUBAN TARGETS. ALSO, THE

OPNS OFFICERS CAN
EMPLOY NSA-CONTROLLED POSITS ON TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY UP TO
24 HOURS WITHOUT NOTIFYING THIS AGENCY CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE.

(B)

CUBAN

IS CONTINUING

ON A 24H TERRITORY BASIS. THE PRESENT EQUIPMENT, WHEN AUTHORIZED BY

RELEASING OFFICER

DEM/D.Cht. D31

GORDON A. BLAKE, JAGEN, USAF, DIR

RELEASED AT (2020)

05-20-25 22

PAGE

1 of 3

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

BTC

10207/05

0521012

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO

TOP SECRET DINAR

AGI

BTC

SUSPENSE

TOP SECRET DINAR

TOP SECRET DINAR

COPY NR.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

INFO PRECEDENCE
NONE

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE: 5 OCTOBER 62

TO:

ADDL EQUIP ALREADY ON ORDER, WILL DOUBLE OUR PROCESSING CAPABILITY
AND WILL ALLOW FOR THE TIMELY CUBAN

INTERCEPT. TO ALLOW FOR THE CURRENT PROCESSING EFFORT, EQUIP AND
PERS WERE DIVERTED FROM OTHER HIGH PRIORITY TASKS TO ENABLE THE
PROCESSING OF THE CUBAN TAKE AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE AND
PROVIDE YOU WITH TIMELY TECH SUPPORT. ACTION TO FORWARD APPROPRIATE
COLLATERAL INFORMATION HAS BEEN EXPEDITED. YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS
ON HOW THIS PROCESSING CAPABILITY CAN BE ENHANCED OR TECH SUPP
IMPROVED WOULD BE MOST WELCOME.

(C) THE HIGH PRIORITY GIVEN TO THE CUBAN PROBLEM WITHOUT
INCREASED AUTHORIZATIONS FOR PERS HAS STRAINED THE SIGINT COMMUNITY
IN TERMS OF RESOURCES AVAIL FOR DIVERSION AGAINST THIS TARGET. THE
NSC HAS RESPONDED ADMIRABLY TO THIS HIGH PRIORITY TASK. WE LOOK
TO YOU TO CONTINUE TO PROVIDE A STRONG ELEMENT OF LEADERSHIP IN
SECURING MOST EFFECTIVE UTILIZATION OF RESOURCES ALLOCATED TO THIS
REQUIREMENT. THE CLOSE LIAISON WITH CINCLANT MAINTAINED BY

DIRNAVSECGRULANT AND NSA REPRESENTATIVES WILL ENABLE US, THROUGH
THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS, TO PROVIDE A BETTER RESPONSE TO CINCLANT

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (2010)

2

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

PAGES

2 OF 3

AGO NR.

207/65

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTC

AGO

TOP SECRET DINAR

AGI

DTC

SUSPENSE

TOP SECRET DINAR

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

COPY NR.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
ROUTINE

INFO PRECEDENCE
NONE

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE: 5 OCTOBER 62

TO:

INTELL REQUIREMENTS.

3. I WILL CONTINUE TO DIVERT TO THE CUBAN PROBLEM AS MANY RESOURCES AS IS CONSISTENT WITH MAINTAINING OUR WORLD WIDE SIGINT POSTURE.
YOUR SUGGESTIONS AND/OR RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS REGARD ARE MOST WELCOME.

PART II FOR CRAIG AND KLOCK.

1. YOUR ACTIONS TO DATE HIGHLY COMMENDABLE IN SUPPORT OF DIVERSIONS TO ACCOMMODATE CUBAN PROBLEM. I KNOW YOU WILL CONTINUE THIS SUPPORT FOR ESG IN CARRYING OUT THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SPECIAL ATTENTION

I HAVE ASKED ADM KURTZ TO PROVIDE IN PART I ABOVE. YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS ALSO SOLICITED.

M/R: Part I of this message discussed with D32; PO4/05; and concurred in by Mr. Buffum, for ADP; and RADM L. R. Schulz, ADN. Part II added by the Director.

SN/D312/3391/5 Oct 62/mw

DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER
---------	-------------------

RELEASED AT (ZULU) 2

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

AGI NR.

AGO NR. 207/05

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

AGO

DTC

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

PP
DE

CLASSIFIED

ZKZK PP NOA RLR NNN NRL DE

P 092215Z

FM

QO DIST VICTOR ROMEO/ELINT ONE

ZEM

S E C R E T

CLASSIFIED

POSSIBLE KOMET III IN KBA

A RADAR IDENTIFIED AS A POSSIBLE KOMET III WAS INTERCEPTED

FGCI 091745-1748Z AND 1804-1805Z. DF INFORMATION INDICATED AIRBORNE

CLASSIFIED

PLATFROM. NO VISUAL CORRELATION WAS OBTAINED; MEASURED

PARAMETERS WERE AS FOLLO:

FREQ:

PRF:

PW:

S

SVP-3

0700 0700

09/0214Z OCT

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 13526
by Director, NSA/CIA, COM

Dec 2000 2000

This is the Report that
Haw's card notes a
Response to this 5x3"

Cuban Crisis

10 Oct 1962

NSA Produced Series X-Ray, FUNNEL
SIGINT End-Product Release

From : D12NS17

To :

Ref. No.: ADP/51-62, DTG 141432Z.

You , , , , DTG 092215Z
indicated possible Cuban acquisition of
potentially offensive weapons and should
have been given "FUNNEL" handling

~~Scanned:~~

-OR elint Report from

Still Searching for ADP

Cuban Logistics:

10 Oct 1962

NSA Produced Series X-RAY, FUNNEL
Saint End-Product Released.

From : DIRNSA

To :

Ref : NSA ADP/51-62, DTG 141452Z.

Yours , DTG 092215Z
indicates possible Cuban acquisition of
potentially offensive weapons and should
have been given "FUNNEL" handling

10 October 1962

~~(TSC)~~ Memo from Director, Blake → Klocko -
COMUSAFSS.

"I feel...that our first priority ^{is} ~~is~~ is reporting reaction in connection with high and low level reconnaissance flights. Our problem is that limitations in physical facilities enable us to do

facilities
only very limited processing these - the
processing capability presently on board
enables us to do ~~only~~ ~~any~~ limited
~~processing these.~~ to meet in a barely
limited fashion the urgent job reaction
reporting. In order to program the analysis
necessary to meet the requirements of
CONAD and AFLANT, we would have
to double our present analytic effort

"Based on our preliminary information it would appear that in addition to the personnel required to perform the mission outlined above there may be some to intercept and process some portion of the Cuban military problem. If so, I might further propose a co-located army-air force facility at

~~DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4(E.O. 12815)~~
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSB
Yours date 20 Aug 98

Lt. Gen. Blake asked Klock for
his comments re: the interim solution
and the longer term solution *

DTG: 302241Z, AGO * 10234/30, 02

30 Oct 62

[REDACTED] 10 Oct 62 1649Z

DIST: [REDACTED]

INTERCEPT OF PROBABLE CUBAN AIR DEFENSE GRID TRACKING

On 9 October 1962, a probable Cuban [REDACTED] facility was intercepted passing air defense grid tracking reports. The system being used is similar to the [REDACTED] grid system used by the Soviet/[REDACTED] prior to 25 March 1962.

COMMENTS: Although the tracking data passed is possibly practice, it is the first intercept of what appears to be instantaneous air defense tracking. A grid system was previously intercepted on 14 May 1962; however, that information was a transmission of a post-flight report.

Source: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

ELECTRICAL RELEASE

11 Oct 62

DIST: [REDACTED]

FURTHER INFORMATION ON CARGO SHIPMENTS TO CUBA IN SOVIET SHIPS

1. An additional 13 Soviet merchant ships have been noted in COMINT en route or possibly en route Cuba since the publication of [REDACTED]. The following details concerning these ships are available. Read in six columns: Ship [C/S, Gross Tonnage]/Area of Departure/Port Declared/Cargo Declared/Known Cargo/Remarks.

LABINSK' [UQJR, 6660]/Black Sea/Conakry/1370 tons general/xxxx/xxxx

IVAN POLZUNOV' [UVMB, 7176]/Baltic/Accra/1676 tons general/six 2.5-ton trucks, five 2.5-ton open-body trucks, miscellaneous motor vehicles, tinmed goods, geological prospecting equipment/xxxx

PARTIZAN BONIVUR' [UVZV, 10078]/Black Sea/Accra/1776 tons general/xxxx/second trip

AMATA' [UFIM, 3359]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx

SIMFEROPOL' [UVTG, 9344]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/not to be confused with the refrigerator ship SIMFEROPOL', also currently en route Cuba

BRATSK' [ULAC, 5518]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/second trip

SRETENSK' [UNZE, 2352]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/one large wooden structure, five trucks or cranes/third trip

OMSK' [UQVZ, 11067]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/second trip

AL'MET'EVS'K' [UKKB, 5411]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/third trip; possibly en route Cuba

ALEKSANDROVSK' [UVZW, 5411]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/third trip; possibly en route Cuba

DUBNO' [UBFM, 7265]/Black Sea/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/possibly en route Cuba

LENINSKIJ KOMSOMOL' [UQJM, 12016]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/second trip; possibly en route Cuba

VOLGOLES' [UQIT, 4638]/Baltic/xxxx/xxxx/xxxx/second trip.

2. The cargo ship USSURIJSK [UYIE], which was reported [REDACTED] as possibly en route Cuba, is now considered to be definitely en route Cuba.

3. Three ships, previously reported en route or possibly en route Cuba, are now known to be en route ports other than Cuba. These are the cargo ships SOBOLEVO [USLZ], DVINOLES [UYSA], and the passenger ship GRUZIYA [UPOV].

4. The following cargo and passenger information, obtained from collateral sources, is available on ships previously reported en route Cuba: (a) METALLURG BAIKOV [UWQU], 14 trucks, four mobile cranes, two buses (all painted olive drab), 40 men and women sighted on deck; (b) KOMILES [UQIW], wooden boxes on deck; (c) SIMFEROPOL' [UBMY], five 2.5-ton trucks, four or five panel trucks; (d) USSURIJSK [UYIE], 13 military vehicles; (e) IL'YA MECHNIKOV [UPVW], approximately 20 trucks (probably 2.5-ton); (f) NIKOLAJ BURDENKO [UPVY], six very large crates, one large canvas-covered object, two gravel shovels, two 2.5-ton trucks, one 2.5-ton open-body truck (all trucks loaded); (g) ARKHANGEL'SK [UVCO], 14 loaded trucks on deck; (h) FIZIK VAVILOV [UYU], trucks sighted on deck; LENINOGORSK [UIWY], one tank truck (in addition to known cargo already reported); ANGARSKLES [UYST], six very large crates on deck.

5. Although Soviet cargo shipments to Cuba thus far in October continue at a rate considerably above what had been considered normal prior to the third (calendar) quarter 1962, there has been a slight decrease since the end of the first week of September. Lately, there have been occasions when Soviet ships have actually declared for Cuba and international commercial traffic has periodically provided information of cargoes for Cuba being loaded in the Soviet Union. However, the vast majority of ships involved in Soviet/Cuban trade continue to screen their activities by either utilizing false cargo and port declarations or by simply not issuing declarations of any kind. Those cargoes, known to have been delivered to Cuban ports in late September and early October, have been primarily of a technical/military nature.

6. There have been 140 Soviet dry cargo voyages to Cuba since 1 July 1962. These voyages represent a total of 998,411 gross tons.

(DIST: [REDACTED]

16 October 1962

From : DIRNSA

To : CUSASA
DIR NSR
USA FSS

~~TS COMM channels~~

1. NSA is establishing an ad hoc planning group to prepare a plan to improve the collection and processing posture against Cuba. The major areas to be studied investigate by the group are:

- A. Scope of effort required by recent developments, both tech and political.
- B. The feasibility of a greater degree of centralization of effort, including the consolidation of intercept and processing at as few locations as technically practicable.
- C. The establishment of jointly managed faces (intercept and processing) to take advantage of available manpower and physical faces.
- D. Pers Rqmts, Construction Rqmts, and other casting data necessary to support the effort.

2. The Study Group will submit this
plan by 1 Nov 62.
(ADP, Maj Gen. John J. Davis, USA
asked for the SCAs' cooperation)*

* TS DIENSA May, AGO # 10054/17, DTG
1715 33Z.

*Cuba*NSA FORM NUMBER REV JUN 61
(Supersedes NSA Form 104 APR 54)
to be used until otherwise directed~~TOP SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NO. *4*

ACTION PRIORITY	INFO PRIORITY	SPECIAL HANDLING	DISTRIBUTION
PRIORITY	COURIER	SECURE COMMUNICATIONS	

FROM: DIA/NSA	DATE: 16 OCT 62	DISTRIBUTION
TO: CUSASA DIA/NSC USAFCSS		PO4 6 P 1 B 2 C 4 H 2 G1 5 PO2 2 ADM 2 DRF 2 D32 4 D31 3 ASALEGP 2 AFSS/PM 3 ADMSG 3
INFO: COBASA (FM) ADMMSG USAFCSS (FM)		
5 0 3 - S E C R E T - COMMINT COMMINT		
ADP/161-62		
<p>1. DIA IS ESTABLISHING AN AD HOC PLANNING GROUP TO PREPARE A PLAN TO IMPROVE THE COLLECT AND PROCESSING POSTURE AGAINST CUBA. THE MAJOR AREAS TO BE INVESTIGATED BY THIS GROUP ARE:</p> <p>A. THE SCOPE OF REPORT BASED BY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, BOTH TECH AND POLITICAL.</p> <p>B. THE FEASIBILITY OF A GREATER DEGREE OF CENTRALIZATION OF REPORT, INCLUDING THE CONSOLIDATION OF INTERCEPT AND PROCESSING AT AS FEW LOCATIONS AS TECHNICALLY PRACTICABLE.</p> <p>C. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINTLY MANNED FACS (INTERCEPT AND PROCESSING) TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AVAIL MANPOWER AND PHYSICAL FAC.</p> <p>D. PERS RQMTS, CONSTRUCTION RQMTS, AND OTHER COSTING DATA NEC TO SUPPORT REPORT.</p> <p>2. THE STUDY GROUP WILL SUBMIT THEIR PLAN BY 1 NOV 62.</p> <p>3. YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS PLANNING GROUP IS REQUESTED.</p>		

RELEASED AT (SAC/DO)

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

AMSI NR.

ABO NR.

DTC 1005417

171533Z

REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
ADD N	HANDLS VIA COMMINT COMMINT ONLY
AG1 O	
DTG N	
SUSPENSE E	

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

COPY NR.

ACTION PRIORITY

INFO PRIORITY

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SPECIAL HANDLING

CONTINUATION

CONTINUATION

FROM:

DATE: 16 OCT 62

TO:

ESSENTIAL. APPRECIATE YOUR APPOINTING A BGP, AND ADVISING NSA (ATTN: pp4) SOONEST. THE FIRST MEETING OF THE GROUP WILL TAKE PLACE IN ROOM 3W100 AT 0900, 22 OCT 62.

Shown to : ASALMGP {
ADMSG {
USAUSE (FM))

F04/3538-8/16 Oct 62/rb

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (2020)

x

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

PAGES

2 or

2

AGI NR.

AGO NR.

05417

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTG

AGO

HANDBK FOR SECRET CHANNELS ONLY

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

NSA FORM 1020 REV JUN 61
(Supersedes NSA FORM 1020 REV APR 58
to be used until exhausted)

COPY NR

ACTION PRECEDENCE

OI

INFO PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

SPECIAL HANDLING

CONFIDENTIAL CHANNELS

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: DIBNSA

Lov

DATE 22 OCT 62

TO: JCS

INFO: CUSASA

~~TOP SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL CHANNELS~~

ADP 176

At
~~NEC ACTION BE TAKEN~~
REQUEST ~~STRENGTH BE DIVERTED~~ TO MOVE 326 ASA CO TEMPORARILY FROM
FORT BRAGG N.C. TO ~~IMMEDIATELY~~, TO PROVIDE
VITAL AUGMENTATION OF SIGINT SUPPORT ON CUBA. ALL RESOURCES OF
313 USASA BN, INCLUDING 326 USASA CO, WILL BE PLACED IN DIRECT
SUPPORT OF APPROPRIATE COMMAND UPON JCS IMPLEMENTATION OF CURRENT
CUBAN CONTINGENCY PLANS UNDER DISCUSSION.

B 2
C 4
Pg2 2
Pg4 5
ADP 1
ADM 5
DRF 2
ASALNGP 2

31 2
BII 2

M/R: CUSASA IACG 3764, requested NSA request JCS to direct the movement of the 326th USASA Co. to *Above msg requests* JCS action on the above and informs JCS that all resources of 313th USASA BN including 326th USASA Co. would be placed in direct support of appropriate command upon implementation of JCS Cuban Contingency Plans.

CONCUR ADM
SHOWN TO ASALNGP
CO 313th USASA BN

Attn
Pg4, 3356, ajs, 22 Oct 62

DRAFT

J, Pg4, 3538

RELEASING OFFICER

J. J. Davis
J. J. DAVIS, MAJ GEN, USA, ADP

RELEASED AT (2020)

2

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

AGO NR

AGO NR

10094/22

221812Z

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ADD

AOI

OTG

SUSPENSE

~~HANDLED VIA CONFIDENTIAL CHANNELS ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

RECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12818
by Director, NSA/CSS, CSB
date 20 Sept 98

0 NNNNTZCZCKHA053

00

000

POTENTIAL

D USN 22
0 ZKZK 00 NNN DIS NRL DE

ZHD

0 230516Z

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY/ALFA

ZEM

~~SECRET SABRE~~

N
0

0 [REDACTED] SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OWN, SPOT REPORT, *0440*, *Attache*

0 REPORT NR 2

0 1. AT 230412Z WHILE AT POSITION 3036N 6530W C70 AS DETERMINED BY

0 DF SIGINT TRAWLER SHKVAL/UHUXN ORIGINATED AND PASSED A [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MESSAGE OF FLASH PRECEDENCE TO CARGO VESSEL

0 ALANTIKA/UPGJ. THIS TYPE OF PRECEDENCE RARELY OBSERVED. *230516*

SIGNIFICANCE UNKNOWN.

0 2. ON THE SAME SCHEDULE THE SHKVAL ORIGINATED AND PASSED A [REDACTED]

0 [REDACTED] MESSAGE OF UNDETERMINED PRECEDENCE TO

0 THE ALANTIKA FOR MURMANSK TRAFLOT HODOZOV.

0 3. LATEST POSITION ON THE ALANTIKA IS 4036R 6618W C90

0 222134Z AS DETERMINED BY DF.

0 0950 0950

0 23/0516Z OCT

0 NNNN

This work sheet contains information affecting the security of defense systems of the United States or information whose unauthorized communication or disclosure may damage the defense of the United States.
Section 102, Title 10, United States Code, and the National Security Act of 1947, prohibit the unauthorized communication or disclosure of such information.
CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Defense Intelligence Agency. It is the property of the Defense Intelligence Agency, is loaned to your agency, and is to be returned to the Defense Intelligence Agency upon request. It is loaned to your agency for your official use and is not to be given to any member of your staff or to any other person or organization without the written consent of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

CLASSIFIED

TZCZCKHA084LA R060

00

ZZK 00 NNN DIS NRL DE

O 230636 Z

FM USN 22

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY/ALFA

Z EM

S E C R E T SABRE

REPORT NR 3

1. AT 230533Z THE PASSENGER CARGO VESSEL NIKOLAJ BURDENKO/UPVY RELAYED AND INCOMPLETE [REDACTED] MESSAGE OF URGENT PRECEDENCE FROM THE CARGO VESSEL KURA/UYSM FOR MOSCOW.
2. AT 230614Z NIKOLAJ BURDENKO RELAYED AND INCOMPLETE [REDACTED] OF URGENT PRECEDENCE FROM THE KURA FOR MOSCOW.
2. AT 230416Z NIKOLAJ BURDENKO WAS LOCATED AT 2248N 5924W C60 AS DETERMINED BY DF.
4. AT 230056Z THE KURA WAS LOCATED AT 2312N 8224W C60 AS DETERMINED BY DF.

1000 1000

23/0635Z OCT

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

EXTERNAL	INTERNAL
RCI/STATE	
CSS 00	TOP
1362 001	ONI 10 17
OUT C	AFSSC USAF
JCS	
	ANALYST
	DOC TI

[REDACTED] 62 SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OWEN, SPOT REPORT,

See [REDACTED]

for cere.

230636

CLASSIFIED

Z CZ CKHA08 [REDACTED]

00 [REDACTED]

EXTERNAL	160
RCI/STATE	[REDACTED]
CIA	[REDACTED]
AIR FORCE	[REDACTED]
ARMY	[REDACTED]
OPR	[REDACTED]
AFS	[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ZKZK OO NNN DIS NRL DE


O 230750Z

FM USN 22

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY/ALFA

2 FM

~~4 1 2 R E T S A B R I~~



160 [REDACTED]

D

REPORT NR 4

CLASSIFIED

1. IN A WEA MSG SOVIET TANKER ADLER/UFRZ GAVE POSITION OF

2600N 5242W AS OF 230600Z

2. IN A DPR SOVIET CARGO VESSEL FARAB/UFB GAVE POSITION OF

3829N 2459. AS OF 230500Z. IDENTIFIED VESSEL BY CAPTAIN NAME.

D

3. IN A DPR SOVIET PASSENGER VESSEL LITVA/UVC GAVE POSITION

11

3911N 2542E AS OF 230500Z.

10

4. IN A WEA MSG THE SOVIET TANKER GROZYJ/UNZ GAVE POSITION OF

10

2724N 3842W AS OF 230600Z.

10

5. AT 230657Z ODESSA RADIO/UFB RELAYED A

MESSAGE OF VERY URGENT PRECEDENCE FROM MOSCOW TO AN UNKNOWN VESSEL.

10

6. AT 230715Z ODESSA RADIO RELATED A

MESSAGE OF VERY URGENT PRECEDENCE FROM MOSCOW TO SOVIET CARGO VESSEL

10

MEDNOGORSK/UQHJ.

10

1300 1300

10

23/0749Z OCT

NNNN

10

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws. Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 702, 704 and 706, the transmission or the communication or the receiving or the transmission of unauthorized persons is prohibited by law. THIS FORM IS FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY.

Contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws. Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 702, 704 and 706, the transmission or the communication or the receiving or the transmission of unauthorized persons is prohibited by law.

THIS FORM IS FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY.

DO WORK SHEET


CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1964-617-424

DO WORK SHEET

VVZC7CKH068

00



ZZK 00 NNN DIS NRL DE

0 230910 Z

FM USN 22

TO NOVEMBER WISKEY/ALFA

ZD1

~~SECRET SABRE~~

See

7/11 1400

SIGHT READINESS BRAVO, QFH, SPOT REPORT

REPORT NR 5

1. IN A PLAIN LANGUAGE MESSAGE INTERCEPTED AT 230722Z RELAYED

WESOA RADIO/UFB BY SOVIET CARGO VESSEL METALLURG KURAKO/DERM

ADDRESSED TO ALL VESSELS IN ZONE FOX ROT, MOSCOW RADIO/UAT

REQUESTED A VERY URGENT OS OPS KE

WITH SOVIET CARGO VESSEL DUBNO/UBFH AND SOVIET CARGO VESSEL

DIVNOGRSK/UQH 0108708 OR 16992 KCS. SIGNIFICANCE UNKNOWN.

2. IN A WEA MSG SOVIET CARGO VESSEL DIVNOLES/UWSA GAVE POSITION

230910Z

OF 2548N 1336E AS OF 230600Z

09 REQUESTED A VERY URGENT OS OPS KE
01
02 WITH SOVIET CARGO VESSEL DUBNO/UBFH AND SOVIET CARGO VESSEL

03 DIVNOGRSK/UHMT ON08708 OR 16992 KGS. SIGNIFICANCE UNKNOWN.

04 2. IN A WEA MSG SOVIET CARGO VESSEL DV1HOLE/UYSA GAVE POSITION
05 OF 2548N 1336E AS OF 230600Z

230910Z

06 3. AT 222019Z DUBNO WAS LOCATED AT 2206N 7712W C100 AS DETERMINED
07 BY DF.

08 4. AT 221626Z DIVNOGRSK WAS LOCATED AT 2300N 7912W C100 AS
09 DETERMINED BY DF

10 5. AT 230724Z UFB PASSED AN ECPHPLFT F [REDACTED]
11 MESSAGE OF VERY URGENT PRIORITY TO LITTAUDR RURAD.

12 6. AT 230750Z SOVIET CARGO VESSEL SRETFSK/UVMO RELAYED A
13 [REDACTED] MESSAGE OF VERY URGENT
14 FROM MOSCOW TO SOVIET CARGO VESSEL AMMET'EVSK/UKKB.

15 7. 221200Z THE SRETFSK WAS LOCATED AT 3250N 4454E AS DETERMINED

16 BY WEATHER, TRAFFIC.

17 8. AT 201508Z THE AMMET'EVSK WAS LOCATED AT 2700N 6312W B50
18 AS DETERMINED BY DF.

0900 0900

19 230907Z OCT

NNNN

CLASSIFIED

2CZCKHA096 [REDACTED]

00 [REDACTED]

REF ID: A61101

DE [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED

ZKZK 00 NNN DIS NRL DE

CLASSIFIED

0 231034Z

CLASSIFIED

FM USN 22

CLASSIFIED

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY/ALFA

CLASSIFIED

ZEM

CLASSIFIED

S E C R E T SABRE

CLASSIFIED

[REDACTED] SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OWEN, SPOT REPORT,

CLASSIFIED

REPORT NR 6

CLASSIFIED

1. AT 230852Z THE SOVIET CARGO VESSEL AL'MET' EVSK/UHKB

CLASSIFIED

ORIGINATED AND PASSED A [REDACTED] MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED

OF URGENT PRECEDENCE TO THE SOVIET CARGO VESSEL SRETENSK/UJWQ

CLASSIFIED

FOR FURTHER RELAY TO MOSCOW.

CLASSIFIED

2. AT 230901Z THE SRETENSK PASSED ABOVE MENTIONED [REDACTED] MESSAGE

CLASSIFIED

TO MOSCOW RADIO/UAT.

CLASSIFIED

3. AT 230614Z THE SRETENSK WAS LOCATED AT 3412N 4042W C60 AS

CLASSIFIED

DETERMINED BY DF.

CLASSIFIED

4. AT 230849Z THE AL'MET' EVSK WAS LOCATED AT 2318N 8012W B30

AS DETERMINED BY DF.

1

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Act, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793 and 798. Its transmission or communication in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1967 1-144-14

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

OZKZK OO NNN DIS NRL DE

7761

0 231326Z

CLASSED AFM USN 22

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY/ALFA

ZEM

~~SECRET SARRE~~

SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, ONE, SPOT REPORT.

REPORT NR 7

1.1. AT 231116Z SOVIET PASSENGER VESSEL NIKOLAEVSK/URST REPORTED HIS POSITION AS 2135N 7316W STATING THAT A NEW SHIP APPEARED ON AN APPROACHING COURSE. VESSEL REQUESTED TO OBSERVE (PROSHU SLEDITX).

1.2. AT 231135Z VESSEL GAVE HER POSITION AS 2132N 7325W STATING THAT A U.S. WAR VESSEL NR 889 WAS FOLLOWING HER ON A PARALLEL COURSE REQUESTING TO KNOW WHERE SHE WAS FROM AND THAT THE WAR VESSEL WAS CONTINUING TO FOLLOW US.

1050 1050

23/1325Z OCT

NNNN

7761 326-2

00

ZKZK 00 NNN DIS NRL DE

0 231432Z

FM USN 22

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY/ALFA

ZEM

~~SECRET SABRE~~

SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OWEN, SPOT REPORT,

REPORT NR 8

AT 231340Z THE SOVIET PASSENGER VESSEL NIKOLAEVSK(URST) GAVE HER POSITION AS 2119N 7356W AND STATED THAT U.S. WAR SHIP NR 889 IS CONTINUING TO ACCOMPANY HER.

0400 0400

WEXQRWOZ OCT

CLASS

NNNN

23 10 328

This work sheet contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Defense Intelligence Agency. It has been reviewed and approved by an appropriate Defense Intelligence Agency manager or Joint Intelligence Officer. Its distribution outside DIA is prohibited by law.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1964 4-7-22
THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY
CLASSIFIED NOFORN SHEET

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED

AUSSEN

LAR 1762CKHB082

00

ZKZK 00 1111 DIS FILE DE

0 231730 Z

FH USN 22

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY / ALFA

Z E I F
S Y N C R E T S A B R E

SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OWN, SPOT REPORT

REPORT NR 9

1. AT 231500Z THE SOVIET CARGO VESSEL USTYORZHA (U162) WAS CARRYING ON CARGO OPERATIONS IN CUBAN PORT OF HOA.
2. AT 231500Z THE SOVIET PASSENGER CARGO VESSEL ADMIRAL

NAKHLOV (UKDD) REPORTED HER POSITION AS 2139N 4815W.

0500 0500

123/1729Z OCT

2317302

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of Title 10, U.S.C., the Constitution or the revolution of which is any manner to an

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 1951-1952

ZCZCCOE068TMZKZK 00 NNN NNL DIS DE

THQH

'00 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ZKZK NNN DIS NNL DF

O 231912Z

FM USN 22

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY/ALFA

ZEN

PC

~~SECRET SABRE~~

DO

CO

SI

REPORT NR 11

11. AT 231830Z THE SOVIET PASSENGER VESSEL NIKOLAEVSK (URST)

REPORTED THAT SHE WAS AT THE ENTRANCE OF AN UNIDENTIFIED

CUBAN PORT AWAITING A PILOT.

1000 1000

231912Z OCT

U.S. GOVERNMENT ORIGINATED OR MAILED IN THE UNITED STATES
ORIGINATED OR MAILED IN ANY MEMBER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMM. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
MAILED, TRANSMITTED, OR RECEIVED THIS DOCUMENT BY TELETYPE, TELETYPE EQUIPMENT,
TELETYPE MACHINES, OR AUTOMATIC TELETYPE EQUIPMENT.

U.S. GOVERNMENT ORIGINATED OR MAILED IN THE UNITED STATES
ORIGINATED OR MAILED IN ANY MEMBER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMM. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
MAILED, TRANSMITTED, OR RECEIVED THIS DOCUMENT BY TELETYPE, TELETYPE EQUIPMENT,
TELETYPE MACHINES, OR AUTOMATIC TELETYPE EQUIPMENT.

This work contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Defense Intelligence Agency. It has not been reviewed or approved by the Defense Intelligence Agency. It remains the property of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Its contents are not to be distributed outside the agency without its written permission.

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

THIS FORM 5022, 5022-1, 22100

~~SECRET~~-KIMBO

[REDACTED]
23 Oct 62 2115Z
DIST: [REDACTED]

FURTHER INFORMATION ON: UNUSUALLY HIGH LEVEL OF CRAF PILOTS
ACTIVE ON 18 OCTOBER

Further analysis of Cuban MiG activity [REDACTED] on 18 October 1962 reveals that of the 63 MiG pilot suffixes active on that date, twelve were Russian, one was Czechoslovakian, and an additional twenty-two were non-Cuban, probably Russian.

COMMENTS: Only those pilots noted speaking in the Russian language are identified as Russian. The identification as non-Cuban, probable Russian, is made on the basis of distinctly heavy slavic accents.

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~-KIMBO

Oct 23, 1962: US announced USSR had started building offensive missile bases in Cuba.

Pres. Kennedy ordered US naval + air forces to establish an " quarantine" (partial blockade) of Cuba to prevent further delivery of offensive weapons aboard Soviet - Bloc or any other ships.

USSR said US action could end in thermonuclear war; warned that Soviet ships would not submit to search.

UN Security Council coworked; Acting Secy. Gen. A Thant pleaded for negotiation.

Kennedy charged Soviet - Cuban action had upset precarious status quo which had long existed between East + West in regard to nuclear weapons.

(1)

CRITICOMM Requirement

24 Oct 1962

Msg. from DIRNSA → JCS, J-6

"This Agency had an urgent CRITICOMM requirement for a duplex circuit between NSA and [redacted] This circuit should be engineered for 61.1 baud modulation rate, polar signalling at the NSA terminal and neutral at [redacted] terminal. Target date is ASAP and upon customer's advice." *

* (C) DIRNSA msg. A60 * 10139/24, DTG 241810Z

CLASSIFIED

DE [REDACTED]

ZKZK OO NNN DIS NRL DE

TO 241638Z

M USN 22

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY /ALFA

ZEM

SECRET SABRE

[REDACTED] SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OWEN, SPOT REPORT

REPORT NR 19

1. HFDF FIXES AND TRUE POSITIONS INDICATES THAT SOVIET CARGO
VESSEL URGENCH (ULGI) HAS ALTERED COURSE AND IS PROBABLY EN-
ROUTE BACK TO PORT. POSITIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

232010Z 3630N 1836W 040


240520Z 3623N 1518W TRUE POSIT

241311Z 3548N 1330W C75

0700 0700

24/1638Z OCT

NNNN



This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C., or an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET
THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED

NNNN [REDACTED]

00 00 [REDACTED]

DE [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED

ZKZK 00 NRL NNN DIS DE

0 24 19 18

FM USN 22

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY/ALFA

ZEM

CLASSIFIED

SECRET SABRE [REDACTED]

REPORT NR 23

1. HFDF FIX INDICATES THAT SOVIET CARGO VESSEL BOL'SHEVIK
SUKHANOV (UJYP) HAS ALTERED COURSE AND IS PROBABLY ENROUTE
BACK TO PORT. POSITIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

230035Z 3648N 2530W D110

231500Z 3417N 2524W TRUE POSIT FM USN 0012

241523Z 3700N 1930W C60

0688 0688

24/19 17Z OCT

DSS DATE AND [REDACTED]

EXTENSIONS	
RCI/STATE	[REDACTED]
CIA CC 24	21 123
AFSSOP	[REDACTED]
DFI/ACSC	[REDACTED]
ONL	[REDACTED]
AFSSP JSAF	[REDACTED]
JCC	[REDACTED]
ANALYST	
ZICON	[REDACTED]
DOO	B

NEA RS 97 Rev Mar 69

1 Pw

241918

CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIED CLASSIFIED

TZCZVZ1J257

ZKZ PP ZOS ZMD DELABO 14

E EEE E E E AR

OO

DE

ZKZK OO NNN DIS NRL DE

O 242030Z

FM USN 22

TO DIST NOVEMBER WHISKEY/ALFA

ZEM

SECRET SABRE

SIGINT READINESS BRAVO, OWEN, SPOT REPORT,

REPORT NR 25

1. HFDF FIX ON THE SOVIET CARGO SHIP KISLOVODSK (UIWR), ENROUTE
TO CUBA, INDICATES THAT THE SHIP HAS ALTERED COURSE TO THE
NORTH.

FOLLOWING POSITIONS ARE AVAILABLE:

231228Z 3530N 2500W C100

231500Z 3643N 2432W TRUE POSIT FM UKN 125

241533Z 4300N 2512W C65

D 0600 0600

241228Z OCT

EXTERNAL	INTERNAL
REVISER	ZHO
DATA	
COM	
ANALYST	
DOC	PDS

IPW

244030Z

●TOP SECRET●

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR

ACTION PRIORITY	INFO PRIORITY	SPECIAL HANDLING	-COMINT COMINTS
-----------------	---------------	------------------	-----------------

FROM: DIBNSA	DATE: 26 OCTOBER 1962	C	5
TO: CUSASA		CI	5
DIAKAYSECIBU		CI1	2
		CI11	2
INFO: DIAKAYSECIBU/LANT		CI2	7
		CI4	5
		B	5
		DA	1
		PO4	5
		D302	2
		ADP	1
		DRP	2
		ASALNP	5
		ASSE/PX	5
		NSC/JM	5

TOP SECRET COMINT GRAMMAR

LDP 168

IN ACCORDANCE WITH DISCUSSIONS HELD BY CUBAN AUGMENTATION
COMMITTEE 22-23 OCTOBER REQUEST ASA PERSONNEL BEING TRAINED FOR
DUTY ON BOARD UENS MILLER BE MADE AVAILABLE TEMPORARILY TO
DIAKAYSECIBU TO MAN VACANCIES CREATED AT BY
TRANSFER OF CONFIDENTIALITY PERSONNEL.

DIRECT LIAISON IS AUTHORIZED. REQUEST YOU KEEP ME ADVISED.

DO NOT DESIRE PERSONNEL TO LOSE IDENTITY AS PROSPECTIVE CREW FOR
UENS MILLER.

N/R: Further action on recommendations of Cuban Augmentation
Committee. Coordinated with:

, b/c c, 3911, 20 OCT 62, 2h

REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	RELEASED AT (2000)
D/C C	RELEASING OFFICER <u>B. K. Buffen</u> B. K. BUFFEN, RADM	PAGE 1 of 1
		PAGES 1
		ADM NR
		ADM NR 10247/26
		STC 2620492

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12815
by Director, NSA/Chm, CSIS
date 20 Jan 98

I. Summary

1. Floating Platforms

During the month of September, the USNS VANDER
USNS ROBINSON were operational from
ports. The USS OXFORD continued operations in the
Havana vicinity. Activation work on the USNS MULL
to be used in support of the Cuban intercept effort
began on 1 October.

pg. 6

I. Summary

6. Improvement of Collection + Reporting on Cuba

a. ELINT:

With increased SIGINT collection facilities and establishment of an ELINT processing effort within PROD, the exploitation of Cuban ELINT

b. COMINT:

(1) In a further effort to reduce the backlog, a new element has been established within Project

(2) Mechanization of the radio printer intercept has produced a significant decrease in the time necessary to process Cuban radio printer traffic.

Pg. 6

~~SECRET~~

COPY NR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE

DOUE

SPECIAL HANDLING

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY/NOFORM

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: DIRNSA
TO: CIA/CHAIFFMAN USIB VIA SPINT
CIA/GENERAL CARTER VIA SPINT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, RCI
SSO, ACSI, D/A (MAJOR GENERAL FITCH)
AFSSO, USAF (MAJOR GENERAL BREITWEISER)
CIO, ONI (OP922Y) (RAIM LOWRANCE)
SSO DIA (LT GENERAL JOSEPH F. CARROLL)
JCS (MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD COLLINS)
AEC
FBI (-----, COURIEZ)

DATE: 26 OCTOBER 1962

P05 1
B 1
BL 1
C 1
ADP 1
ADM 1
DIR 1
PTWO 1
NSACP 1
FBI 1

~~SECRET / COMINT CHANNELS/NOFORM~~

P05/ 334

REF P05/310-62, 222334Z LINE THREE ABOVE MESSAGE SHOULD BE AMENDED
TO READ QUOTE WILL BE REPORTED AS TOP SECRET CAT THREE NOFORN EXCEPT

M/R Self-explanatory

1/P05/3538-S/26 Oct 62/mb

DRAFTER

/P05/3538-S / , ---, --,

RELEASED AT (2000)

2

PAGE PAGES

1 OF 1

AGI NR

AGO NR

10085/26

DTG

261601Z

REF ID: A6520000000000000000000000000000

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

INFO N
AGI O
DTG N
SUSPENSE E

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 13526
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS
Date 20 Dec 98

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DISTRIBUTION IV

DATE: 26 October 1962

FROM : M6

SUBJECT: Courier Service

Armed Forces Courier Service is making daily courier flights to Homestead Air Force Base, Florida. Material destined for this area should be hand-carried to M6 for entry into the Courier Service.

Chief,

M6

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 13526

by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

1 Dec date 20 Aug 98

CLASS

Check against copy in file
for DUPE*

This work sheet contains information affecting the N
Saficons 793, 794 and 798, the transmission.

O 270643Z 1962

TO REST ROMEO VICTOR/ELINTMNE

CLASSIFIED

ZEM

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED

CUBAN SPOON REST ACTIVITY

AT 270438Z INTERCEPT WAS MADE ON THREE RADARS IDENTIFIED AS
SPOON REST (EW/ACQ; DF LINE BEARINGS INDICATE EMITTERS LOCATED
AT MARIEL, HAVANA EAST, AND POSS MATANZAS SITES. EMITTERS REMAIN
ACTIVE W 06 10Z.

CLASSIFIED

SCP-3

0800 0800

27/0645Z OCT

*(See rear)
Revised*

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 13526
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

Rew Date 20 Dec 95.

270611

If the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. C.,
of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

TOP SECRET DINAR

COPY NR

3

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE	INFO PRECEDENCE	SPECIAL HANDLING	DISTRIBUTION
PRIORITY	PRIORITY		
FROM: DINRAA		DATE: 27 OCTOBER 1962	
TO: SSO DIA			ADP 2 EADP 1
INFO: AFSSO USAF			A 5 B 2 C 5 PO4 2 PO5 2 A1 2 A2 2 A3 2 A4 2 A6 2 C1 4 C11 4 C15 4
TOP SECRET DINAR			
A/390-62			
REF: DIAAQ2 3043-62			B2 4 B3 2 NSACP 1 DR 1 D302 1
1. MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE USE OF PRESENT RESOURCES AT OUR DISPOSAL NOW IS BEING MADE. CRITICAL COLLECTION DEFICIENCIES HOWEVER, EXIST IN THE FOLLOWING AREAS: CUBA.			
2. IN ORDER TO INCREASE COLLECTION AND REPORTING IN THESE CRITICAL AREAS, AS SPECIFIED, I.E. LOGISTICS BUILDUPS AND TROOP MOVEMENTS, WE WILL REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING:			
A. REDEPLOYMENT OF USS OXFORD OR ANOTHER SIMILARLY CONFIGURED SEABORNE PLATFORM, WITHIN RANGE OF CUBAN SIGNALS (MINIMUM 20 MILES OFFSHORE).			
B. EQUIPPING FOR OPERATIONAL UTILIZATION ALL C130 ACRP TRAINER AIRCRAFT.			
C. SCHEDULING OF FREIGHT FLIGHTS TO CONFORM WITH ACRP FLIGHTS.			
3. OPTIMIZING OF CURRENTLY AVAILABLE AIRBORNE COLLECTION WILL REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT, PROPERLY CONFIGURED. SUCH AIRCRAFT			

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

Z

CH OFFICE

OPERATIONS OFFICER

PAGE

PAGES

1

2

AGI NR

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 13526
by Director, NSA/CSS, COMINT
[Signature] Date 20 Aug 96

AGO NR

10067/37

~~TOP SECRET DIA/MR~~

COPY NR

REV JUN 61
REV APR 63
Amended

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRECEDENCE

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

DATE: 27 OCTOBER 1962

NOT NOW AVAILABLE TO THIS AGENCY FOR TASKING.

4. MORE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS MUST AWAIT MORE PRECISE GUIDANCE.

NSA HAS OPTIMIZED ALL SIGINT RESOURCES DURING CURRENT EMERGENCY TO

PRIMARY TASK OF RECOGNIZING

PREPAREDNESS FOR

HOSTILITIES. MOVEMENT OR BUILDUP OF LOGISTICS AND/OR TROOPS ALREADY
ESTABLISHED AS A PRIMARY INDICATOR.

M/R: This message is in response to DIA request for NSA recommendations for optimizing aerial reconnaissance detection of

CUBAN troop and logistic buildups and/or movements. A meeting held at 1000 hrs on 27 Oct 62 chaired by A Watch Office with appropriate A, B, and C personnel and DIA representatives resulted in: 1) Clarification of requirement 2) extension of deadline from 1700 hrs 27 Oct to 0800 hrs 28 Oct 62. 3) arrangement for knowledgeable NSA representative to visit DIA on 29 Oct 62 for on-the-spot assistance or clarification.

Contents of this msg prepared and concurred in by A Group

Watch/3627

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

PAGE

PAGES

2 OF

2

ACT NR

ABO NR

067/27

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

DOCUMENT MARKING

CLASSIFICATION

DTG

~~TOP SECRET DIA/MR~~

29 OCT 62

OFFENSIVE-WEAPONS MESSAGES**(FORMERLY CALLED "FUNNEL" AND CONTROLLED)****NEW INSTRUCTIONS:**

1. USE REGULAR SERIES (~~TOP SECRET DIA/MR~~)
AND ALSO USE THIS LEGEND.
2. BE SURE THAT THE OSCAR USED DOES NOT HAVE **ON IT.**
3. PRINTED IN BLACK.

BOTH ELECTRICAL AND HARD COPY ~~MUST~~ HAVE THE LEGEND.

30 Jan 63

Per POS

Regular series now and no legend.

5

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12815

by Director, NSA/CSS, CSB

[Signature] date 20 Aug 98

This work sheet contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or the revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

RULE GOVERNMENT PRACTICE RELATING TO
THIS FORM FOR INTERNAL AGENCY USE ONLY

CLASSIFIED WORK SHEET

Processing - Cuban Crisis '62

AGO 10234

302241Z Oct 62

Blake to Klocker

States that NSA's first priority requirement - is reaction reporting in connection w. high and low level reconnaissance flights.

Physical facilities at enables only very limited processing there.

Includes proposal to establish at a facility capable of intercept processing and reporting of Cuban tactical air and Cuban air defense communications.

(green notebook)

30 Oct 1962

SIGINT Intercept units:

will originate
COMINT-derived advisory warnings.

* TS Navy Department Msg - A61 54337
From CNO → CINCLANFLT, 30 2324Z
Oct 62.

In-Flight Advisory Warning Plan

30 October 1962

In a DIRNSA message to COMUSAFSS (Klocko), Lt. General Blake, USAF, advised the following course :

1.
2. Colonel _____ of your staff has just completed a briefing for members of my staff in which he outlined the requirements of CINCONAD and CINCAFLANT for COMINT support to enable them to fulfill their responsibilities. Although we have received no formal statement of requirement as outlined by Colonel there is no question about the validity of the requirement to keep CONAD and CINCAFLANT currently advised of the Cuban Air situation. I feel, however, that our first priority requirement is reaction reporting in connection with high and low level reconnaissance flights. Our problem is that limitations very in physical facilities at _____ enables us to do only limited processing there. The processing capability presently on board enables us to meet in a barely adequate fashion the requirement for reaction reporting, in order to perform the analysis necessary to meet the requirements of CONAD and AFLANT, we would have to double our present analytic effort at
3. We can however, provide a very limited response to these requirements by adding a small number of Air Force personnel familiar with these requirements to the complement at _____ operating under the control of OIC, _____ and permitting these individuals to pick off as a by-product of our limited processing in support of the reaction reporting that information which would also satisfy CONAD and AFLANT to the extent possible. When the processing is not engaged in supporting reaction reporting, we will direct the OIC, _____ to satisfy the requirements of CONAD and AFLANT to the extent possible.
4. It is our understanding that the information produced as a result of the arrangements outlined above would be passed over a communications circuit to MacDill AFB where it would be relayed to the other Air Force

consumers. Pertinent information could also be passed by appropriate secure means to CONAD Control Center

5. I have been advised that we have received the authority to move in to Therefore, as longer term solution to our problem, I would propose to task the [Army with establishing ?] a facility capable of intercept processing and reporting of Cuban tactical air and Cuban Air Defense Communications. Based on our preliminary information it would appear that, in addition to the personnel required to perform the mission outlined above, there may be space to intercept and process some portion of the Cuban Military Problem. If so, I might further propose a co-located Army-Air Force facility

[Note: General Kloc's comments on the interim and longer term solution
/ Kloc's
we solicited by Gen. Blake in this message.*]

* (TSC) DIRNSM Mag to COMUSAFSS, DTG 302241Z, 10234/30.

27. Cuban Crisis

a. During the Cuban crisis, D3 personnel were assigned to JCS J-3 Battle Staff at the Pentagon to ~~keep~~ keep NSA, Fd. Meade, apprised and up to date on all significant collateral data relating to the Cuban crisis. Present planning is for D3 personnel to return to Battle Staff for duty if the crisis is re-awakened.

b. Arrangement was made with JCS J-3 to provide for automatic inclusion of NSA representation when future crises dictate reviving the Joint Battle Staff. Project Officers names were exchanged (for NSA, for JCS) and the individuals have been in contact.

c. D3 maintained a constant watch over all SIGINT support plans and implementing actions during the Cuban crisis, as well as the up-dating of CINCLANT and corresponding Component plans.

(2)

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR

4

ACTION PRECEDENCE		INFO PRECEDENCE	SPECIAL HANDLING	COMINT CHANNELS		DISTRIBUTION
PRIORITY	PRIORITY					
FROM USAFSS			DATE 06 NOV 62	INFO	A	5
TO AFSSO USAF	STRIKECOM				B	3
AFSSO CONAD	AFSSO CCC				B1	2
AFSSO SAC	CINCLANT				B11	4
AFSSO TAC					C	6
INFO JCS (JRC)	AFSCC				C1	4
DIRNSA	6940TTW				C11	5
NAVSECGRU	DIRNAVSECGRULANT				DRF	2
ASA					D31	4
					D32	4
					P04	5
					NSACP	1
					D3EXEC	1
					AFSS	3
					ADNSG	3
					B1101-1	
					B1401-1	

~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

ODD 6-11-66.

AFSCC EMERGENCY REACTION UNIT NR 1) BECOMES OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVE
070500Z NOV. UNIT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COLLECTION, PROCESSING AND
REPORTING COMINT AND ELINT INFORMATION ON THE CUBAN AIR PROBLEM.
COMMUNICATIONS ROUTING INDICATOR ASSIGNED TO THE UNIT.
BECOMES EFFECTIVE IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE. AS SOON AS CIRCUIT TO NSA
BECOMES OPERATIONAL. PENDING THIS, SHOULD BE UTILIZED.
REQUEST BE ADDED AS RECIPIENT OF REPORTS DEALING WITH
IMPENDING RECONNAISSANCE OPERATORS IN ORDER THAT RECON REACTION
REPORTING WILL BE MEANINGFUL TO CONTROLLING AUTHORITIES. REACTION
REPORTING WILL BE DISSEMINATED ON AS NEAR REAL-TIME BASIS AS
POSSIBLE. COMPLETENESS AND ACCURACY WILL BE COMMENSURATE WITH
PRE-FLIGHT AND POST-FLIGHT SUPPORT INFORMATION WHICH IS PROVIDED.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT 1200Z

2

PAGE 1 OF 2

AGEN NR

55036

ACQ NR

REF ID: A

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

BY

ADD

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

062030Z

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

P

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY

INFO PRIORITY

SPECIAL HANDLING

COMINT CHANNELS

REQUEST ... BE FURNISHED INTELLIGENCE ON ANY
CHANGES TO LOCATIONS OF CUBAN RADARS AND AIR UNITS DERIVED FROM
ANALYSIS OF RECONNAISSANCE RESULTS.

DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (0000)
DOCUMENT MARKING		PAGE 2 OF 2
REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY	AGI NR 55036 AGO NR
AGO		DTG 062030Z
AGI		
DTG		
SUSPENSE		

7 November 1962

From DIA NSC → DIR NAVSECGRS

which after the Air Force "fairly" was able to assume satisfactorily the responsibility for intercept, processing and reporting to the Cuban Air Defense Problem purposes. Further to improve the Cuban aspect, the consideration of the intercept, processing and reporting of the Cuban naval and shipping problem at

A. The processing and reporting responsibilities of [] will be:

(1) Complete field processing and reporting to the Cuban Naval Problem.

(2) Spot reporting of significant developments on the Cuban naval [] and shipping problem.

(3) Trajectory analysis on assigned targets to support mission and complete trajectory analysis on Cuban naval problem.

(4) Daily and weekly Cuban Naval wrap-up reporting *

* TSC DIENSA. Msg, AGO # 1115.8/07,
DTG 072101Z, (msg. dated 7 Nov 62)

(5) Spot and summary reporting of Cuban air activity in response to reconnaissance mission in accordance with established procedure.

(6) → Development and reporting of Cuban naval orders of battle status.

B. To accomplish the above recommend the following intercept be allocated.

Target	<u>NR</u>	<u>Pos</u>	<u>Manned/Harass</u>	TYPE
1	4		24	
1	3		0	
	10		24	
	3		24	
	4		24	
	1		24	

Note: This is a good source, showing a well passed consolidation of Cuban Naval and Shipping info. msg. is filed in CUBA, I, Blue book

~~SECRET~~

NSA FORM NUMBER REV JUN 61
(Supersedes R-228 REV APR 54
to be used until exhausted)

COPY NR

3

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE	INFO PRECEDENCE	SPECIAL HANDLING
OP IMMEDIATE	OP IMMEDIATE	COMINT CHANNELS

FROM	DIRNAVSECGRU	DATE: 07 NOV 62	ACT INFO	DISPOSITION
TO	DIRNSA //ADV COPY TO P2//	SUSP DATE 07 NOV 62		-BT-----2
INFO	CNO COMUSAFASS CINCLANTFLT	ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU		A B C C1 DRF D908 D31 ADP P04 P05 S ADNSG SUSP P

~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

A. USAFSS 031835Z NOTAL

B. USAFSS 061423Z NOTAL

1. COMM PROVISIONS REF A CONSIDERED MIN NECESSARY SUPPORT
 2. REF B INDICATES DIFFICULTIES IN MEETING COMM REQUIREMENTS, PARTICULARLY
 WITH REGARD SECURE VOICE COMMS FROM TO ARCC.

3. I MOST STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT TRANSFER OF MISSION
 REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES FROM BE DEFERRED

UNTIL SUCH A TIME AS ALL COMM FACILITIES ARE INSTALLED AND
 OPERATION, AND A DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY EXISTS SATISFACTORY TO
 TO PROVIDE HIM WITH TIMELY AND COMPLETE

*ANSWERED
 IN SEVERAL
 MSGS -*

INTELLIGENCE TO THE SAME DEGREE AS IS CURRENTLY BEING DONE BY

4. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP.

B101-1

B1401-1

M63 NOTE DTG 061423Z AGI 54974
DTG 031835Z AGI 54576

DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (2010)
WRD/GPN DOCUMENT MARKING Q .. 1 / 1 - 112 - 117 11125/67 11158/67		<i> </i>
		PAGE PAGES 1 1
		AGI NR 55279
		AGO NR

REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	DTG
AGO AGI DTG SUSPENSE <i>W/R</i>	HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY	071522Z

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 13526
 by Director, NSA/CSS, CG
[Signature] *060200Z Mar 98*

8 November 1962

DIRNSA To

1. Request translations of current ^{release, reports and} intelligence value directly to consumer.
2. Primary reporting responsibility to the intelligence unit derived from Cuban and air-air, air-ground communications and communications between communications service.

A. First priority is processing and reporting on Cuban reactions, O/S high and low altitude reconnaissance flights. Maximum effort must be made toward real time provision and reporting. These reports should be issued at emergency precedence to the distribution specified in TTAC below.

* TSC DIRNSA msg I
11245/08, DTG 082 143 Z.

AEO*

~~SECRET~~

NSA FORM M630 REV JUN 61
(Supersedes M630 REV APR 60
to be used until exhausted)

COPY NR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

ACTION PRECEDENCE OP IMMED	INFO PRECEDENCE OP IMMED	SPECIAL HANDLING COMINT CHANNELS	DISTRIBUTION
FROM CINCLANT		DATE 13 NOV 62 // ADV COPY TO B11//	ACT INFO
TO DIRNSA			B11 6
INFO: COMKWESTFOR DIRNAVSECGRU COMUSAFSS			B 3
SECRET COMINT CHANNELS			
A. YOUR 121852Z			
B. COMKWESTFOR 122350Z			
1. CONCUR TRANSFER CUBAN AIR/AIR DEFENSE PROBLEM			
FROM			
NSA M63 NOTE: COMKWESTFOR DTG 122350Z AGI 56089. DTG 121852Z AGO 11008/12/ORIG DIR.			

DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (TOLDO)
REA/RNE/13-2-32		Z
DOCUMENT MARKING		PAGE 1 OF 1
		AGI NR. 56195
		AGO NR.
REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	DTG
AGO	HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY	131541Z
AGI		DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12818
DTG		by Director, NSA/CIO, CGS
SUSPENSE		<i>[Signature]</i> <i>[Signature]</i>

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12818
by Director, NSA/CIO, CGS
[Signature] *[Signature]*

NSA's Contribution to the Review of the TelC Actions
relating to the Cuban Arms Build-up
during the period 14 Apr - 24 Apr 1962.

dd Dec 62

TS 04850

[now decontrolled]

To Dir's Readig File, DIR/PROD

A few subjects follow: NSA/SCA Contingency Study for
the Director 15 July 63

Misc
Item 71 USIBMtg2

21. Cuban Situation

a. D3 representatives attended a joint NSA/SCA meeting concerning interim operations and long-term SIGINT planning for CUBA. A statement of intended minimum collection requirements was presented by the F Organization and SCA representatives gave their views on various approaches for long range operations. The SCAs were in general agreement that allocated efforts would be preferable to joint operations, and further that two locations would be required in Florida because of logistic problems. It was proposed that NSA determine the number + size of fixed installations, the host-tenant relationships and communications requirements.

b. The USAF has directed its appropriate Commands to extend the TDY on loan for the Cuban situation until July 63. They suggested that if NSA foresees the need that steps be taken through appropriate external support channels to obtain them on a more permanent basis. PO2 has been asked to investigate this matter.

(over)

c. D3 representatives attended a meeting with representatives from NSG, P2 and B1 on 11 Dec. The purpose of the meeting was to determine procedures to establish a cross communication from the USS Oxford to A proposal by the NSG representative to arrange a KW-26 Bravo Patch was accepted as a satisfactory solution to the requirements.

d. D3 has completed a survey and has catalogued total communications circuitry for the and complex between all pertinent location. This effort is available for briefing purposes with associated background discussion on the geographical ~~section~~ logistics and environmental situation in that area.

6 Dec 1962

DIRNSA → CHSASA

DIR NAVSECGRU

COMUSAFSS

1. Formulation of agent force and programming of permanent facilities in Florida for use against Sov/Cuban problem has been delayed pending development of requirements of NSC 14002 for intelligence from Cuba. This in turn has awaited classification of a USIB estimate regarding ultimate Sov posture in Cuba. During interim period we have been advised to continue our effort against Sov/Cuban problem generally at our present levels.
2. Guidance for interim adjustments involving Cuban naval and shipping problem was furnished to NSC and ref D-X

*TSC DIRNSA msg # A60 # 12062/06, dt 6
061727Z

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 13526
by Director, NSA/CSS, COMINT
BLW date 20 Aug 98

ACTION PRECEDENCE

PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE

COURIER

SPECIAL HANDLING

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

DIR 2
P64 5
P65 5
P62 2
A 5
B 2
B1 2
C 6
C1 5
C11 5
D31 4
D32 3
ADM 2
ADP 1
DRF 2
ADMSG 3
ASALMGP 2
AFSS/PW 3
P2 8

B14 - 1

FROM DILNSA

DATE 6 DEC 62

TO CUSASA
DILNSA/SECURITY
COMUSARPSS

INFO:AFSS/PW, (COURIER)
ADMSG (COURIER)
CUSASA/PW (COURIER)

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

ADP/249

A. MY 171533Z OCT/ADP/161-62
B. MY 022306Z NOV/ADP-198-62
C. MY 072101Z NOV/ADP/268-62
D. MY 041713Z/ADP-245-62
E. USAFSS 282325Z NOV/OPD 28-11-105

1. FORMULATION OF RQMT FOR AND PROGRAMMING OF PERMANENT FACILITIES

IN FLORIDA FOR USIB AGAINST SOV/CUBAN PROBLEM HAS BEEN DELAYED

PENDING DEVELOPMENT OF USIB RQMTS FOR INTELL FROM CUBA. THIS IN

TURN HAS AWAITED CLARIFICATION OF A USIB ESTIMATE REGARDING ULTIMATE SOV POSTURE IN CUBA. DURING INTERIM PERIOD WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORT AGAINST SOV/CUBAN PROBLEM GENERALLY AT OUR PRESENT LEVELS.

2. GUIDANCE FOR INTERIM ADJUSTMENTS INVOLVING

ON CUBAN NAVAL AND SHIPPING PROBLEM WAS FURNISHED TO NSC IN REF D.

DRAFTER

MAJ GEN JOHN J. DAVIS, USA, ADP

RELEASING OFFICER

MAJ GEN JOHN J. DAVIS, USA, ADP

RELEASED AT (DDUO)

Z

PAGE PAGES

1 OF 2

AGC NR

AGC NR

12062/OC

061727Z

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO N
ACI O
DTG M
SUSPENSE E

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

ACTION PROCEDURE

PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE

COUNTER

SPECIAL HANDLING

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM

DATE 6 DEC 62

TO

IN REGARD TO ASA AND AFSS, WE ARE CONTINUING TO USE CONTINGENCY OR
EMERGENCY REACTION UNITS PENDING DEVELOPMENT OF A PERMANENT LONG
RANGE PLAN. FURTHER GUIDANCE REVISING OR ESTABLISHING INTERIM RQMTS

FOR ASA AND AFSS FORTHCOMING SHORTLY.

3. FOR THE LONG TERM PERMANENT INSTALLATIONS, WE ARE ASSUMING THAT

RQMT WILL GENERALLY APPROXIMATE LEVEL OF PRESENT EFFORT. WE ARE

THINKING TENTATIVELY ALONG LINES OF CONSOLIDATION AT ONLY TWO LOCATIONS, IN

ADDITION TO PRESENT SHIPBORNE AND ACRP EFFORTS AND

ONE OF THESE WOULD BE LOCATED

FOR INTCP OF SIGNALS ABOVE

THE HF SPECTRUM AND ONE AT AN ACTIVE INSTALLATION IN

HF INTERCEPT. IT IS ENVISIONED THAT THESE INSTALLATIONS WILL BE

JOINTLY MANNED AND OPERATED ALONG THE PATTERN ALREADY ESTABLISHED

FOR

DO NOT BELIEVE WE CAN EXPECT DOD SUPPORT FOR

SEPARATE LOCATIONS FOR EACH SERVICE TO COPE WITH A COMPARET TYPE OF
APPROACH.

4. WE PROPOSE TO CONVENE AN NSA/SCA PLANNING GROUP TO WORK OUT
RQMTS FOR AND DETAILS OF OPERATION OF THE PERMANENT FACILITIES WITH
INITIAL MEETING AT NSA 11 DEC 62. PLEASE ADVISE NAMES OF YOUR NSPs
AND ANY COMMENTS YOU CONSIDER PERTINENT AT THIS TIME.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (2020)

2

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

PAGES

2

OF

3

AGC NR

AGO NR

062/06

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DTC

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

TO > SECRET DINAR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

COPY NR

ACTION PRECEDENCE
PRIORITY

INFO PRECEDENCE
COURIER

SPECIAL HANDLING
NONE

DISTRIBUTION

FROM:

DATE: 6 DEC 62

TO:

SUBSEQUENT TO COMPLETION OF JOINT NSA/SCA PLAN, PROPOSE TO
SUBMIT RQMTS TO DOD IN PCP FORMAT AS AN ADD-ON TO PRESENT OPINS LEVELS.

M/R: Prepared under guidance from DIR in order to proceed with
long term planning against Cuba at an early date.

Concurred in by:

DAIN

A

B

C

P1

P0

P2

Shown to CUSASA/PM

AFSS/PM

ADNSG

P041, 4618-S/6 DEC 62/jm

RELEASED AT (2020)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

ACO NR

ACO NR 062/oc

DTG

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

DOCUMENT MARKING

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AGO

AGI

DTG

SUSPENSE

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

TOP SECRET DINAR

MR file
13/10/52

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPOSAL FOR SNIE ON THE
SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN CUBA

The continuation of a Soviet military presence in Cuba after removal of the MIG's and IL-28's raises important questions for intelligence and for policy.

USIB departments and agencies have been working individually to develop and report the pertinent facts. Their interpretations have varied in scope and emphasis. Meanwhile, the press has directed public attention to the continued Soviet military presence in Cuba, and the President and Secretary of State have taken note of the problem in public statements.

Secretary Rusk has suggested that a coordinated intelligence assessment be prepared for the White House.

I therefore propose that USIB undertake preparation of a SNIE on the current Soviet Military Presence in Cuba for approval by next week's meeting. The SNIE should cover such points as (a) the composition,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12815
by Director, NSA/CSS, CGS
[Signature] *on [Signature]*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

organization, strength, and disposition of the Soviet military presence; (b) Soviet intentions as to continuing it and increasing or reducing it; (c) Soviet short-term and long-term objectives in maintaining it; (d) probable Cuban and Latin American reactions to its continuation; and (e) probable political and strategic effects of its continuation.

-2-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

MAIL FORM NUMBER NEW JULY 21
(Supersedes M-7265 NEW APR 30
to be used until otherwise directed)

Copy NB

ACTION PRECEDENCE DEFERRED		INFO PRECEDENCE DEFERRED		SPECIAL HANDLING COMINT CHANNELS		DRAFTED BY	
FROM	DIRNAVSECGRU	DATE	11 DEC 62	ACT	INFO	ADM	25
TO:	DIRNSA					A	5
INFO:	ASSTD DIRNAVSECGRU					B	3
						B1	2
						B11	6
						C	6
						C1	4
						C11	5
						DIR	1
						D31	4
						D32	4
						ADP	2
						PE2	6
						PP4	6
						PP5	1
						PD55	2
						DRF	2
						ADNSG	3
						B14-1	1
S E C R E T COMINT CHANNELS							
BLAKE FROM KURTZ INFO PENDERGRASS FUTURE EMPLOYMENT							
USS OXFORD							
A. DIRNSA MSG ADP/245 (041713Z)							
B. MY 182320 NOV							
1. AM PREPARING PLAN FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REF A, INCLUDING COMPUTATION OF ANY ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION THAT MAY BE REQUIRED FOR THE BUILD UP AT AS WELL AS MAKING THE A PERMANENT OPERATION. AS I AM SURE YOU WILL AGREE, WE WILL WITHHOLD IMPLEMENTATION UNTIL DETAILS ARE FULLY WORKED OUT.							
2. I WOULD LIKE TO EXPAND ON MY THINKING, AS EXPRESSED IN REFERENCE (A), TO NOT USE <u>OXFORD BILLETS AS COMPENSATION</u> FOR <u>THE OXFORD REPRESENTS A FIXED INVESTMENT BY NAVY OF</u> <u>HULL AND GENERAL SERVICE CREW WHICH WILL NOT VARY, REGARDLESS</u> <u>OF SIZE OF NAVSECGRU OPERATIONS. SUCH INVESTMENT WAS FULLY</u> <u>JUSTIFIED BY ORIGINAL CONCEPT AS TO NUMBER OF POSITIONS TO</u>							
DRAFTER		RELEASING OFFICER		RELEASED AT (2020)			
CIV/GPII		8-1-16		2			
DOCUMENT MARKING						PAGE	PAGES
						1	2
						ACQ NR	606C0
						AGO NR	-
						DTG	072200Z
REFERS TO MESSAGE*		SECURITY CLASSIFICATION					
AGO		HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY					
ADM							
DTG							
SUSPENSE							
SECRET							

~~SECRET~~

|COPY NR

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

AC 14 PRECIPITATION

DEFERRED

www.FoxSports.com

DEFERRED

SPECIAL HAND LENS

COMMITTEE

BE MANNED AND TYPE OF EMPLOYMENT; HOWEVER, THE REQUIREMENTS OF
THE HAVANA STATION SHIP DO NOT FULLY JUSTIFY SUCH A LARGE INVESTMENT.

3. THE MULLER REPRESENTS A MORE ECONOMICALLY REALISTIC
PLATFORM FOR MEETING THE CUBAN REQUIREMENTS FURTHERMORE
RETAINING THE MULLER AS THE HAVANA SHIP WOULD HAVE CERTAIN
BENEFITS. THE EXPENSE OF THE ADDITIONAL CONFIGURATION OF THE
MULLER FOR THE CRUISE CAN BE SAVED, THE SIGNIFICANT
PERSONNEL FIGURES CAN BE STABILIZED AT THE LESSER
FIGURE, THERE WILL BE NO NEED FOR PERIODIC CHANGES OF STAFF
PERSONNEL, AND THE PERSONNEL SAVINGS CAN BE APPLIED AGAINST
THE INCREASE IN TASKING AT

4. I REALIZE THAT ONE OBJECTION TO THIS PROPOSAL MAY BE THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE OXFORD AS A "SPY SHIP". HOWEVER, THE MULLER MAY WELL INHERIT THE SAME NAME DURING HER INTERIM EMPLOYMENT AS THE OXFORD'S RELIEF. WE ARE GOING TO HAVE TO LEARN TO LIVE WITH PROBLEMS REGARDING THE ACCEPTANCE OF TRS'S IN FOREIGN PORTS, REMEMBERING THAT WITH THEIR STRONG FAMILY APPEARANCE, ALL TRS'S WILL LOOK ALIKE TO FRIENDS, FOES, AND NEUTRALS.

M63 NOTE: ADP/245 DTG 041713Z AGO 12061/04
DTG 162320Z NOV AGI 570C7

DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (2000)
DOCUMENT MARKING		3
PAGE	PAGES	
AGI NR	2 o 2	
AGO NR	60611	
AGO NR		
REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
AGO	HANDLE VIA COMINT CHA WELD ONLY	BYE
AGI		672244Z
OTO		
SUSPENSE	SECRET	

~~TOP SECRET~~

NSA FORM NO. 10
1-1962

333
C319

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~TOP SECRET~~

TO : Distribution P IV

DATE: 11 December 1962

FROM : ADP

SUBJECT: Commendation

Further to my Memorandum of 26 November, same subject, I am forwarding extracts of an exchange of correspondence between the Director and Admiral Dennison concerning the value of the contributions made by the SIGINT Community during the recent Cuban crisis. Request you inform those personnel of your organization involved in the activity mentioned in the Director's Memorandum of the favorable comments made on the results of their work.

Incl:
a/s

John J. Davis
JOHN J. DAVIS
Major General, USA
Assistant Director, NSA
for
Production

HANIC VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

P TOP SECRET COMINT NUMBER 1-60
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 13526
by Director, NSA/CIO, CIO
[Signature] *60 Dec 1995*

~~TOP SECRET~~

ZEB

Memorandum

TO : ADP

DATE: 28 November 1962

FROM : Director

SUBJECT: Appreciation

The President's visit to military units associated with the Cuban crisis symbolizes the "well done" all concerned have merited. The nature of our business prevents public recognition, but all our people who participated should feel they are a part of the President's attention to our military forces on his visit. I have also received a letter of favorable comment from Admiral Dennison who, as CINCLANT, had a major responsibility during the Cuban crisis. I am quoting from his letter, as well as my reply for the information of your personnel concerned with SIGINT support during the recent weeks.

From Admiral Dennison's letter:

"I should like to take this opportunity to mention the very significant contribution which SIGINT in general - and the National Security Agency in particular - have made toward support of the Atlantic Command. The unique and vital intelligence made available as a result of the national SIGINT effort frequently finds its end use and final justification at the level of the Unified Commander. In the present situation SIGINT has been one of the most important single factors in supporting our operations and improving our readiness. Your fine support is much appreciated."

From my reply to Admiral Dennison:

"I hasten to thank you for the favorable mention in your letter of 17 November concerning the significant contribution of SIGINT in the present situation. While you mentioned NSA in particular, I am sure you know that the Army Security Agency, the Naval Security Group, and the Air Force Security Service, together constituting our Service Cryptologic Agencies, deserve a lion's share of credit for their work in the fields of collection and direct processing to our customers. I have taken the liberty of passing on your kind remarks to both NSA personnel and the SCA's as kindred vital elements of our SIGINT team."

GORDON A. BLAKE
Lieutenant General, USAF

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

P TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER 1-62
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

~~TOP SECRET~~

13 December 1962

Resumption of Cases

"There are currently three types of communications in Cuba:

1. Those communications found to be purely Russian.

2. Those " to be purely Cuban.

3. Those " utilizing Soviet procedure and probably presently controlled by the Soviets but involved in joint Soviet-Cuban activities (the Cuban Air Defense system being the primary case)."

* Chieq, B1, Memo to A, B, B1, B231/ [?], subj: Resumption of Cases,
dtd 13 Dec 62.

~~SECRET~~

NSA FORM NUMBER NAV JUN 61
(Replaces NSA Form NAV APR 60
to be used until exhausted)

COPY NR

ACTION PRECEDENCE

ROUTINE

INFO PRECEDENCE

NONE

SPECIAL HANDLING

COMINT CHANNELS

CLASSIFICATION

FROM DIRNSA

DATE 8 JAN 63

LPOU

6

TO USAFSS

A

5

~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

A5

6

C114/06-63

B

3

FOR QFD.

B1

2

REQUEST TECHNICAL RESULTS OBTAINED BY HEARABILITY TESTS ON CUBAN
TARGETS CONDUCTED AT ANY OTHER FLORIDA AF STATIONS

B11

6

C

6

C1

4

C11

5

C12

6

C14

4

DRF

2

AFSSFM

3

CONCUE:

M/R USAFSS was to conduct a HF hearability test on Cuban targets to begin on 3 December 1962. Results of any tests were to be forwarded to NSA. In the event was considered technically unsuitable, USAFSS planned to further conduct HF hearability tests at other active AF stations in Florida. To date, this Agency has not received any results of these tests and required this information for planning overall site capabilities.

RELEASED AT (2020)

08 204 2

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

AGO NR

01179/08

DTS 082112 2

DOCUMENT MARKING

REFERS TO MESSAGE #
AGO N
AGI O
DTO N
SUSPENSE E

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

TRANSMIT VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 13526
by Director, NSA/CNO, CIO
[Signature] Date 20 Apr 95

ACTION PRECEDENCE PRIORITY	INFO PRECEDENCE NONE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	SPECIAL HANDLING		DISTRIBUTION
			COMINT CHANNELS	CONFIDENTIAL	

FROM	CUSASA	DATE	09 JAN 63	ACT:	P04
TO:	DIRNSA			INFO:	A

~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

IATOP-0 0034

YOUR 182108Z ADP/268

1. CONCURE IN PARAGRAPH 2 THRU 5 OF THE TASKING MESSAGE AND AWAIT NOTIFICATION AS TO TIME AND PLACE OF MEETING INDICATED DURING 12 DECEMBER NSA CONFERENCE ON CUBAN PROBLEM TASKING.

2. PENDING THE CALLING AFOREMENTIONED MEETING CUSASA IS CONTINUING OPERATIONS AND IS CONCURRENTLY STUDYING RESOURCES REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN AN ADEQUATE OPERATIONAL POSTURE FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME COMMENSURATE WITH THE ANNOUNCED INTENTIONS OF 12 DECEMBER NSA CONFERENCE.

3. BELIEVE IT NECESSARY THAT THE CURRENTLY INSTALLED AND OPERATING ELINT POSITIONS BE INCLUDED IN THE COLLECTION REQUIREMENT SO AS TO PROVIDE THE CONSUMER WITH AN INTEGRATED SIGINT PRODUCT.

4. NSA AND CUSASA HAVE ALREADY INITIATED ACTION TO AMEND.

6	55386645264423266
5	8
4	81
3	B11
2	C
1	C1
0	C11
-	C12
-	C15
-	D31
-	D303
-	P2
-	P02
-	P04
-	P05
-	P055
-	ADP
-	DRF

DRAFTED		RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT 0800Z	
DOCID	MARKING		PAGE	PAGES
OCD/KLW/ 9-3-59			1	2
			ASIN	
			01454	
			ACO	
			016542	
			DTG	
			091654Z	

REF ID: A MESSAGE
ADD
AGI
DTO
SUSPENSE
511

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

FORM NSRS REV JUN 61
(Under NSA/RDTT APR 68
(or later issue)
(or later issue)

COPY NR

ACTION PRECEDENCE		INFO PRECEDENCE	SPECIAL HANDLING	DISTRIBUTION
PRIORITY	NONE	COMINT CHANNELS		

5. THE AFOREMENTIONED ACTION BY PROD-#2 WAS NECESSITATED BY
THE PRIOR COMMITMENT TO FOURTEEN SEPARATE
PLANS. FIVE OF THESE PLANS ARE ORIENTED. ANOTHER TWO OF
THESE PLANS AFFECT ACTION IN COUNTRIES. IN
VIEW OF THE ABOVE IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT PROGRAMMING ACTION BE
INITIATED AT AN EARLY DATE TO RELIEVE OF ITS CURRENT
OPERATIONS SO THAT IT MAY RETURN TO ITS READINESS STATUS OF A DIRECT
SUPPORT ROLE OF US ARMY COMBAT FORCES

NSA M63 NOTE: ADP/268 DTG 182108Z DEC 62 18 AGO 12160/18

DRAFTER	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (ESTD)
DOCUMENT MARKING		PAGE PAGES
		2 OF 2
		ACT NR
		01454
		4600 NR
REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	DTG
AGO		091654Z
AOL		
DTG	HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY	
SUSPENSE		

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ B1 P7

Prod G/C

Plane

Return to
Reo
See C

3. U.S. AIR DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS

25 Jan 63

RECORDED FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting With Contractors On Cuban Air Defense Requirements

1. A meeting was held in the Director's Conference Room on 11 January 1963 at 1400 hours for the purpose of reviewing and updating contractor requirements on reporting of the Cuban Air Defense problem. The meeting was attended by representatives from DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, State and CIA; NSA participants were

2. The following items were discussed:

a. The SAC proposal to decrease the frequency of reports except when an overflight, sortie or its progress, or no report hostile intent and/or action.

b. The priority order in which

in the Air Defense priorities:

(1) Air reactions to US reconnaissance flights, with real time reporting on overflights and 3-hour reports on persistent record flights.

(2) Cuban aircraft exiting Cuba.

(3) Location and operational status of all tactical aircraft in Cuba.

(4) Civil/military transport, identified as Soviet or Cuban, arriving or departing Cuba.

(5) AOB, proficiency of the air defense/early warning systems, degree of Soviet influence.

(6) Six-hour reports on total air mission of , with emphasis on Soviet participation and influence.

c. The proposal from COMAD to move its portion of the Joint Reconnaissance Control Center (JRCC) at Boca Chica to Montgomery Air Defence Sector (MADS), including the AFSCO Key West and the KW-25 circuit.

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 13526
by Director, NSA/CIA, CG

JRW *00 00 Nov 98*

~~SECRET~~

THIS IS AN UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENT

~~SECRET~~

3. The following agreements were reached:

a. The SAC recommendation was bought by all consumers, subject to the stipulation that possible hostile intent/action toward peripheral flights be accorded the same high priority of overflights.

b. In reference to priorities, the present arrangement was agreed to, except for the following changes:

- (1) The requirement for reporting on peripheral reconnaissance flights is put on the same plane as reporting on overflights.
- (2) The requirements agreed to be in lower priority for reporting were agreed to solely on the basis of the rapidity with which they would be reported. This in no way negated or downgraded the necessity for reporting such items as USSR participation/influence, indications of Russian departure, proficiency of Cuban/Russian Air Defense systems, transport activity in or out of Cuba, and the location and status of tactical aircraft in Cuba.

c. In reference to COEAD's proposal to move to NMADS, the Navy disputed, pointing out the need to keep the KM-26 circuit into Boca Chica for CIRCLANT aircraft. The Air Force explained that, by moving to NMADS, greater intercept capability could be brought to bear on any "bad dog" Cuban pilot who decides to attack the US, or to facilitate any potential defector aircraft's safe arrival in the U.S. It was pointed out that providing the type of reporting desired by COEAD would have an adverse effect on USAF's capability to perform its mission for other consumers. USA will advise NSA of the decision reached on the COEAD request. No further action is required by USA at this time.

Chief,

FOS

cc: AIR
SOI
JMC

~~SECRET~~

P.Rot MoS for Feb 63)

P1 established a study group to review
the reporting on Communist SIGINT
efforts in Cuba. Headed by - - -
of P4, with reps of B1, A14, & P05.

Report due 15 March 1963

ACTION PRECEDENCE

DEFERRED

INFO PRECEDENCE

DEFERRED

SPECIAL HANDLING

COMINT CHANNELS

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: DIRNAVSECGRU

DATE: 21 FEB 63

INFO:

TO: SSO DIA

CINCLANTFLT

A

B

B1

B11

C

C1

C11

D31

P02

F4

P05

ADP

DRF

ADNSQ

INFO: DIRNSA

ASSTDIRNAVSECGRU

DIRNAVSECCRULANT

~~SECRET COMINT CHANNELS~~

~~CUBAN COMINT COLLECTION AND REPORTING~~

~~A. DIRNSA MSG ADP/29-63 (222232Z JAN) ENDAL~~

~~TO PERMIT ASSUMP~~

~~1. BUILDUP OF NAVSECGRU ACTY~~

~~ATION CUBAN NAVAL AND SHIPPING COLLECTION AND REPORTING~~

~~TASKS HAS COMMENCED. ANTICIPATE SHIFT OF REPORTING RESPONSIBILITIES.~~

~~WILL CONCUR DURING MARCH 1963. SPECIFIC DATES WILL BE PROVIDED BY~~

~~STATIONS CONCERNED IN NORMAL SIGINT PRODUCT REPORTING SERIES.~~

163 NOTE: ADP/30-63 DTG 222232Z IS AGO 01208/22

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT (1000)

JHR/TFO 27-63

COLLECTOR/ROUTER

PAGE

1 OF 1

ASIN:

09755

AGO NR.

DTG

211512Z

REFERS TO MESSAGE

AGO

AGI

OTG

SUSPENSE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 12815
by Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

BBW date 20 Aug 95

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY NR.

ACTION PRECEDENCE

INFO PRIORITY

SPECIAL HANDLING

ROUTINE

ROUTINE

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

DISTRIBUTION

FROM: DIRNSA
TO: CINCLANT
INFO: NSA REP CINCLANT

DATE: 19 MAR 63

DRP 2
P04 6
P05 6
A 5
A6 6
B 2
B1 2
B11 2
C 6

M61 2
M63 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ COMINT CHANNELS

DIR 35

A. MY 082132Z, DIR 28 (PASEP)
1. AS INDICATED IN REF A THIS AGENCY HAS RECEIVED
REQUIREMENTS FOR RAPID RECEIPT OF MATERIAL, CLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL, FROM FLORIDA SCA UNITS. REQUEST YOU
PROVIDE SPECIAL JET AIRCRAFT, COURIER WHEN REQUIRED TO
SUPPLEMENT ARFCOS.

2. PROPOS THE FOLLOWING TASK SITUATIONS AND COURSES
OF ACTION ~~IN~~ IN SATISFYING THE REQUIREMENT FOR
FAST TRANSMITTAL OF SPECIFIED MATERIAL WITH NICKNAME
RED COAT.

A. SITUATION ALPHA. MATERIAL ORIGINATES AT ~~AND~~
RED COAT IS TASKED TO MAKE PICKUP AT
NAS AND DELIVER DIRECTLY TO ANDREWS AFB FOR RENDEZVOUS

DOCUMENT MARKING

DC/P04, 3538

RELEASING OFFICER

GORDON A. BLAKE, LT. GEN. USAF

RELEASED AT (ZULU)

DIRECTOR

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

AGENCY

ABO NR.

0303260

REFERS TO MESSAGE

AGO 03208/08

AGI

OTO 082132Z

SUSPENSE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED PUR DDC 3.4 E.O. 13526

BY COMMANDER NSA COMM CDR

201550Z MAR 63

DTG

201550Z

COPY NR.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

REF ID: A6542
 THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE APR 30 1968
 BY SPK

INFO PRECEDENCE

SPECIAL HANDLING

DISTRIBUTION

FROM

DATE:

TO:

WITH NSA COURIER.

B. SITUATION BRAVO IS SAME AS ALPHA PLUS INTERMEDIATE

STOP AT FOR MATERIAL ORIGINATING

AT

C. SITUATION CHARLIE IS SAME AS ALPHA AND BRAVO PLUS

PICKUP AT FOR MATERIAL ORIGINATING AT

D. SITUATION DELTA IS SAME AS ALPHA WITH INTERMEDIATE

STOP ONLY AT

3. REQ DIRNSA AND SPECIFIED SCA UNITS BE NOTIFIED VIA
EMERGENCY PRECEDENCE MSG OF BUNO AND ETAS. MATERIAL WILLBE DELIVERED TO AIRCRAFT PILOT BY SCA REP. AN OFFICIAL
NSA COURIER WILL MEET AIRCRAFT AT ANDREWS AFB AND RECEIPT
FOR MATERIAL DIRECT FROM PILOT.

4. TENTATIVE AREA ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN

INFORMALLY COORDINATED.

5. REQUEST CONCURRENCE AND/OR COMMENTS.

DRAFTER

RELEASING OFFICER

RELEASED AT 0000

DOCUMENT MARKING

PAGE

2 OF 3

ACQ MR.

ACQ MR.

032/20

REFERS TO MESSAGE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGO

AQI

OTG

SUSPENSE

DTE

REF ID: A6542

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

ELECTRICAL RELEASE

19 JUN 63

DIST: OSCAR/XRAY ECHO.....

0/16156-63

**NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland**

COMINT REPORT

WARNING

This Document Contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793, 794 and 798, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

This document is to be distributed to and read by only those persons who are officially indoctrinated in accordance with communications intelligence security regulations and who need the information in order to perform their duties.

No action is to be taken on information herein reported, regardless of temporary advantage, if such action might have the effect of revealing the existence and nature of the source.

DECLASSIFIED per SEC 3.4 E.O. 13526
by Director, NSA/Chief, CES

RBC date 20 Jun 98

~~SECRET SABRE~~

19 JUN 63
DIST. OSCAR/XRAY ECHO

~~SECRET~~ 0/16156-63
(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

19 JUN 63

SOVIET SHIPS IN CUBAN TRADE

1. THIS REPORT CONTAINS DETAILS ON CARGOES, POSITIONS, AND OTHER INFORMATION REGARDING SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS EN ROUTE, IN PORT, OR DEPARTING CUBA AS OF 19 JUNE 1963.

2. LATEST INFORMATION ON SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS EN ROUTE CUBA:

BUKHAREST [UQYR, 21255GT, TKR] 35-48N 38-18W AT 191200Z.

CHERNOVTSY [UVAK, 8229GT, TKR] 25-12N 56-54W AT 190600Z.

DRUZHBA [USQF, 25718GT, TKR] 36-22N 22-38E AT 171500Z.

A COLLATERAL SOURCE INDICATES IT TRANSITED THE BOSPORUS ON 16 JUNE.

DUSHANBE [UJUNC, 7176GT, CG] 26-56N 76-25W AT 190000Z.

DEMOZEPPE GARIBAL'DI [UUZA, 26659GT, TKR] 37-17N 86-42E
AT 171500Z.

EL'SK [UW01, 7949GT, TKR] 52-31E 06-26W AT 170500Z.

GREGORIJ VAKULENCHUK [UVPO, 8229GT, TKR] 22-18N 60-08W
AT 190823Z (WITHIN 85 NM).

KRAZNOGRAD [UQOX, 9254GT, CG] 25-49N 77-19W AT 190500Z.

KRASNYJ OKTYABR' [ULZP, 12285GT, CG] 34-42N 45-12W AT
191140Z (WITHIN 75 NM).

LISICHANSK [UYXF, 23153GT, TKR] 34-36N 46-36W AT 190600Z.

MARIYA ULYANOVA [ULGE, 4871GT, PAS] APPROACHING THE
STRaits OF DENMARK AT 170500Z. ESTIMATED TO HAVE DEPARTED BALFIC
PORT (POSSIBLY LENINGRAD) ON 15 JUNE. CARGO INCLUDES 54 POINT 8
TONS OF CONDENSED MILK AND 95 PIECES OF "GROS" CARGO.

~~SECRET SABRE~~

~~SECRET~~

0/16156-63

(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

MICHOURENSK [UOSB, 5518GT, CG] 27-08N 71-42W AT 190336Z
(WITHIN 75 NM).

OKHOTSK [USKY, 11106GT, CG] 37-18N 133-06W AT 181200Z.

PRAGA [UQPA, 21255GT, TKR] 38-54N 21-06W AT 190957Z
(WITHIN 60 NM).

3. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 29 SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS IN CUBAN
PORTS AS FOLLOWS

ANTILLA

LARINISK [UQIR, 9829GT, CG].

SRETSENSK [UIWA, 5419GT, CG].

SUKHOMA [UPCW, 7212GT, CG].

HAVANA

ALAPAEVSK [URIL, 5411GT, CG].

ALEXANDROVSK [UV2C, 5411GT, CG].

BOL'SHEVIK SURKHANOV [UWIP, 6669GT, CG].

DIVNOGORSK [UQHI, 8843GT, CG].

IVAN POLZUNOV [UVMR, 7176GT, CG] ESTIMATED TO HAVE ARRIVED
HAVANA 18 JUNE.

KIROVSK [UICO, 5518GT, CG].

POTI [UVGI, 8229GT, TKR] ESTIMATED TO HAVE ARRIVED HAVANA
19 JUNE.

SLAVSK [USKR, 9344GT, CG] ESTIMATED TO HAVE ARRIVED HAVANA
19 JUNE.

ISABELA DE SAGUA

METALLURG ANOSOV [USSM, 12285GT, CG]

~~SECRET~~ SABRE

~~SECRET~~ 0/16156-63
(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

MARISL

MEDVEGORSK [UQEW, 8843GT, CG] ESTIMATED TO HAVE ARRIVED MARISL VICE HAVANA 14 JUNE.

MOA

UGLEUTRAL'SK [UHFC, 5628GT, CG] DEPARTED MATANZAS 180530Z. ARRIVED MOA 191030Z.

NICARO

FRUNZE [UVPK, 8229GT, TKR] DEPARTED SANTIAGO 170800Z. ARRIVED NICARO 18 JUNE.

VIL'IVUS [UKEB, 4956GT, CG].

NUEVITAS

ATKARSK [UVAD, 5411GT, CG].

PUERTO PADRE

L'GOV [UQMV, 5382GT, CG].

UNKNOWN

KHESRON [UQNY, 8229GT, TKR] ESTIMATED TO HAVE DEPARTED NUEVITAS 17 JUNE, PROBABLY EN ROUTE HAVANA.

4. THE FOLLOWING SOVIET MERCHANT SHIPS HAVE DEPARTED CUBA AND ARE WEST OF 30 DEGREES WEST:

AMBANGEL'SK [UVCO, 5665GT, CG] 26-54N 64-54W AT 190500Z. DEPARTED NUEVITAS 16 JUNE.

BUDAPEST [UINR, 21255GT, TKR] 26-12N 58-56W AT 190600Z. DEPARTED HAVANA 160700Z.

CZERNYAKHOVSK [UQMH, 5382GT, CG] 25-54N 79-35W AT

~~SECRET~~ SABRE

3

~~SECRET~~ 0/16156-63
(NOT SUBJECT TO AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING)

DISPROCES [UOUB, 5494GT, CG] 34-36N 36-48W AT 181800Z.

ETA KALININGRAD 29 JUNE.


KUBAN' [UOVI, 7176GT, CG] 27-54N 62-24W AT 190537Z
(WITHIN 69 NM). CARGO TO CUBA FROM USSR WAS 32,376 POINT 4 TONS
OF CRUDE OIL. ETA BLACK SEA PORT 28 JUNE.

LUGAREK [UYKE, 22252GT, TKR] 34-54N 37-08W AT 190755Z
(WITHIN 75 NM)

TSIMLYANSKOGS [UKKG, 5494GT, CG] 22-18N 74-54W AT
190000Z. BFD NUEVITAS 18 JUNE.

VARSHAVA [UWOF, 21255GT, TKR] 29-42N 57-12W AT 190600Z.
DEPARTED HAVANA 152948Z.

~~SECRET~~



<u>Serial</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>File</u>	<u>Subject</u>
N1382	Sep 62	0fm-8	Evaluation of Traffic Intercepted by USS OXFORD
N1381	Sep 62	big III	Evaluation of Traffic Intercepted by USS OXFORD
N1792	10 Dec 62	com 1/1	CRITICOMM Traffic Study During Cuban Crisis
N0032	10 Jan 63	0fm-8	Intelligence on the Cuban Arms
N0363	13 Mar 63	clf-3	Re Cuban Crisis

Requested from Repository via

25 Aug 69

With regard to the Cuban situation; in a day-long presentation of the CCP (March 1963), the Director, NSA, suggested to Mr. Kirby, that "especially when presenting to senior DOD officials, I think we should come out loud and clear on the long-term assumption we are making regarding Cuba where we program fixed facilities in Florida."

* DIRNSA Memorandum, Subj: CCP Presentation, addressed to Mr. Kirby DADP, 21 March 1963.

The Directors maintained that it would be more prudent to keep the program at the level NSA recommended, and, if events took a favorable turn, it would be easier to reduce at the time than to find resources elsewhere, if they did not

ACTION PRECEDENCE <u>PRIORITY</u>	INFO PRECEDENCE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	SPECIAL HANDLING	DISTRIBUTION
FROM: DIA/RSA		DATE:	NOT FOR RELEASE	LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
TO: CIA/CHAIRMAN USIB VIA SPINT				PO5 1
CIA/GENERAL CARTER VIA SPINT				B 1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, RCI (MR. ROGER KILSHAN)				BL 1
SSO, ACSI, D/A (MAJOR GENERAL FITCH)				AFP 1
AFSSO, USAF (MAJOR GENERAL BRETTWISER)				D302 1
CNO, ONI (OP-920Y), (RAFM LOWRANCE)				IN 1
SSO DIA (LT GENERAL JOSEPH F. CARROLL)				DIR 1
JCS (MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD COLLINS)				
ASC				
FBI				

~~TOP SECRET DINAR REPORT~~

AIR/

REF DIR/197, MSG 241431Z SEPT, EFFECTIVE UPON RECEIPT. FOLLOWING IS REVISED DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR DIA PRODUCED SERIES I, PAY, JUNTEL SECRET END-PRODUCT RELEASES.

CIA/OCT (EXCLUSIVE FOR GENERAL CARTER)

CIO, ONI (OP-920Y) (EXCLUSIVE FOR RADM LOWRANCE)

AFV/ACSI (EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJ. GEN. FITCH)

DIA/CIC (EXCLUSIVE FOR LT. GEN. CARROLL)

AFSSO USAF (EXCLUSIVE FOR MAJ. GEN. BRETTWISER)

STATE (RCI) (EXCLUSIVE FOR MR. KILSHAN)

JCS (EXCLUSIVE FOR GEN. COLLINS)

M/R: Above message revised distribution of JUNTEL product in accordance with PAIB desires.

COORD: BL 1

DRAFTED

COL/USAY	RELEASING OFFICER	RELEASED AT (CIA)
CHIZY/PO5/3538-S DOCUMENT NUMBER	JOHN J. DAVID/MAT GEN/USA/AIR/333	PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES 100 HR 100 HR
REFERS TO MESSAGE	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	370
ACO N AOI O BTD SUSPEND	TOP SECRET DINAR	

DEC 1986 BY SEC 3.4 E.O. 12815
by Director, NSA/Cyber

~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~